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GREEN WOOD IN THE BUNDLE OF STICKS: 
FITTING ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND ECOLOGY 
INTO REAL PROPERTY LAWt 
Robert J. Goldstein * 
I. INTRODUCTION: GREEN WOOD 
To be alive, wood must be rooted and green. Green wood will bend when 
twisted; it will endure fire; and it will resist breaking. Even when cut 
and detached from its roots, wood remains green for some time. Even-
tually cut wood dries out and begins to rot. The bark covering a piece 
of wood often hides whether the wood is in fact living or dead. Scratch 
below the twig's sUrface and its color will indicate the difference between 
the brittle, detached sticks, and the green wood. 
For almost a century, a chasm has been developing between the 
popular conception of property as things and the theorists' abstract 
notion of property as only consisting of rights and duties. This chasm 
has developed despite the increasing awareness of the need for human 
stewardship of the environment and the development of the science 
of ecology. The nature of ownership in terms of property involves the 
rights and duties which the owners possess incidental to the status of 
title. Modern authorities take the position that a sophisticated per-
spective sees property as a right, rather than a thing.1 This is evident 
t © 1998 Robert J. Goldstein. 
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1 See C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL 
POSITIONS 3 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978). See generally STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF 
PROPERTY (1990). 
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when society distinguishes property from mere possession.2 Nee pos-
sessio et proprietas mis em debent-possession and ownership should 
not be confused.3 "So soon as anyone has said 'You have got what 
belongs to me,' the germs of these two notions have appeared and can 
be opposed to each other."4 
"What distinguishes property from mere momentary possession is 
that property is a claim that will be enforced by society or the state, 
by custom or convention or law."5 The finder of a thing can have 
momentary possession, as can the thief. 
''Property'' is more than just the physical thing-the land, the 
bricks, the mortar-it is also the sum of all the rights and powers 
incident to ownership of the physical thing. It is the tangible and 
the intangible. Property is composed of constituent elements and 
of these elements the right to use the physical thing to the exclu-
sion of others is the most essential and beneficial. Without this 
right all other elements would be of little value .... 6 
Real property refers to ownership of rights in the land or soil, and 
an estate is the possessory interest in real property.7 As land or soil, 
real property is a part of the natural world, part of the biosphere we 
call Earth, and part of smaller functional units which we call ecosys-
tems. There is a connection between pieces of that land, as all are 
interconnected. The land may be perceptibly limited to its surface, (as 
well as some finite below-ground areas, and some airspace, as in the 
case of buildings) but the soils, runoff, and ground water below, and 
the airspace above, as well as the flora and fauna which occupy sur-
face, air, and below-ground, are the vectors of the interconnection.s 
2 See Macpherson, supra note 1, at 3. For an interesting twist on possession and ownership, 
see United States v. Casterline, 103 F.3d 76 (9th Cir. 1996). 
8 DIG. 41.2.52.PR. (Venuleius) (533 CE) in EPITOME OF ROMAN LAW 48 (Charles P. Sherman 
ed.,1937). 
42 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 3 (1911) [hereinafter POLLOCK & MAITLAND]. "[A]s soon as 
there is any law worthy of the name, right and possession must emerge and be contrasted." Id. 
6Id. 
6 Dickman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984) (quoting Pas-
sailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1963». 
7 In distinguishing land as real property from the movables upon it, Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) noted, '''[r]eal' property refers to land or soil .... An 'estate' is a description of the 
ownership interest in the real property. Land (understood as all habitable ground) is to be 
regarded as the substance with respect to whatever is movable upon it, whereas the existence 
of the latter is to be regarded only as inherence." IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS 83 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991). 
8 "The word land includes not only the soil, but every thing attached to it, whether attached 
by course of nature, as trees, herbage and water, or by the hand of man, as buildings and fences." 
Mott v. Palmer, 1 N.Y. 564, 572-73 (1848) (Bronson, J., concurring). 
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This Article is concerned only with real property, and neither with 
the fixtures appurtenant thereto nor with personal property. This 
distinction is necessary to further the thesis that real property war-
rants distinctive treatment based upon its unique character. 
An estate-in-Iand is often identified by its limiting factors in terms 
of the claims of others to title. The estate that will be referred to 
herein is the estate that carries with it the ultimate legal title.9 In 
Roman law the condition might be described as dominium;IO in terms 
of modern U.S. law that estate might be referred to as "fee simple."ll 
It is understood that conditions and limitations do exist with lesser 
interests in real property; indeed, conservation easements exist for 
the very purpose of imposing environmental ethics upon privately 
held land. These lesser estates will, a fortiori, be subject to a subset 
of the rights and obligations found to be incidental to the ownership 
of the estate that carries with it the ultimate legal title in real prop-
erty. 
The issue of "how far private ownership should stretch and to what 
extent it should be modified in the public interest"12 cannot be under-
stood without an "adequate analysis of the concept of ownership."13 
Although slower in evolving than other bodies of law, the laws of real 
property ownership are neither staticI4 nor well settled.16 That very 
fact attests to their fluidity-their evolutionary nature, which is the 
very nature of common law.16 "It is our boast that the law is a pro-
gressive science; that it expands and develops as civilization advances, 
and adapts itself to the moral and ethical standards of successive 
9 "[Tlhe largest estate known to the law: it denotes ... the greatest possible aggregate of 
rights, powers, privileges, and immunities which a person may have in land." C. MOYNIHAN, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 29 (1988). 
10 This is distinguished from sovereignty or "imperium, the rule over all individuals by the 
prince." Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, S-9 (1927). "But early 
Teutonic Law, the law of the Anglo-Saxons, Franks, Visigoths, Lombards and other tribes, 
makes no such distinction; and the state long continued to be the prince's estate so that even in 
the 18th century the Prince of Hesse could sell his subjects as soldiers to the King of England." 
Id. at 9. 
11 ''Tenant in fee simple is he which hath lands or tenements to hold to him and his heires for 
ever. As it is called in Latin, feodum simplex, for feodum is the same that inheritance is, and 
simplex is as much as to say, lawfull or pure." SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 1 (1832). Synonyms for this include "fee" and "fee simple absolute." 
12 A.M. Honore,. Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: A COLLABORATIVE 
WORK 107, 108 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961). 
IBId. 
14 See 2 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICKJ. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY" 190(1) 
(1977) [hereinafter POWELLl. 
15 See EMIL DE LAVELEYE, PRIMITIVE PROPERTY 6 (G.R.L. Marriott trans., 1878). 
16 See generally I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 2 (Oceana 1966) (1859). 
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generations of men."17 Nevertheless, the popular perception of real 
property ownership, especially with regard to real estate transactions 
and the rights appurtenant thereto, is of a well-settled body of law. 
This perception may very well be the result of the relatively short 
period of time during which individuals own real property. In the 
evolutionary sense, the ownership and use of a particular property 
during the course of an individual's lifetime may indicate stability of 
rights and responsibilities, whereas a long-term view demonstrates 
the fluidity more eloquently. That is why it is necessary to trace the 
development of ownership of real property to its origins. The concept 
of ownership contains elements that are variable both in definition 
and in range.1S "The changes are related to changes in the purposes 
which society or the dominant classes in society expect the institution 
of property to serve.1I19 
Taking a wider historical focus, it becomes apparent that the laws 
regarding ownership have evolved dramatically and with clearly iden-
tifiable causes and motivations.20 Even a narrow focus on the history 
of American property law since the ratification of the Constitution 
reveals meaningful changes in both the theory and practice regarding 
real property ownership. 
The possessory estate has certain characteristics, which include: 
the rules regulating relationships with neighbors as to lateral and 
subjacent support, as to nuisances, and as to the adjustments of 
conflicting claims to the available resources of nature, such as 
stream water, percolating water, surface water, oil and miner-
als. . . . The owner of such an estate is always a member of a 
community and, as such, is forced to conform to a formulated and 
established social pattern for the welfare of the groUp.21 
[S]uch an owner must expect to find the absoluteness of his prop-
erty rights curtailed by the organs of society, for the promotion 
of the best interests of others for whom these organs also operate 
as protective agencies. The necessity for such curtailments is 
17 H.H. Rumble, Limitations on the Use of Property, 5 VIRGINIA L. REV. 297, 301 (1918). "No 
question can be settled by a general appeal to the common law. That a given rule prevailed 'at 
common law' does not necessarily mean that the same rule is law today even in the absence of 
legislation on the subject. One needs to know to what period the inquiry related. The common 
law was not and is not a fixed body of rules. It was not and is not the law of the Medes and 
Persians which altereth not." [d. 
18 See Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights, 22 NOMOS 187, 190 (1980). 
19 Macpherson, supra note 1, at 1. 
20 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977) 
[hereinafter HORWITZ, 1780-1860]; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW 1870-1960 (1992) [hereinafter HORWITZ, 1870-1960]. 
212 POWELL, supra note 14, , 190(1). 
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greater in a modern industrialized and urbanized society than it 
was in the relatively simple American society of fifty, 100, or 200 
years ago. The current balance between individualism and domi-
nance of the social interest depends not only upon political and 
social ideologies, but also upon the physical and socialfacts of the 
time and place under discussion.22 
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The "physical" facts of a particular situation regard the real property 
itself: the land or the earth that is the subject of the estate. The land 
or earth is not merely a conceptual theory but a physical reality. As 
such, it is part of the greater system of biotic units that science has 
identified using the term ecosystems. "An ecosystem is basically an 
energy-processing and nutrient-regenerating system whose compo-
nents have evolved over a long period of time."23 These ecosystems 
are earth's "life-support systems."24 
The ecosystem is recognized as one basic unit of the situs of our 
existence. The recognition of the systemic nature of the ecosystem 
inexorably links the land or earth that is the subject of one estate to 
the land or earth that is the subject of another. This linking occurs 
both spatially and temporally. The nature of the system can link 
distant estates as well as adjacent ones. These principles, though not 
settled, are defined through the science of ecology. The "social" facts 
are based on a combination of societal needs and wants, and the 
development of ethos. These social facts may be based on what Locke 
calls "natural consent," which people are led to "by a certain natural 
instinct without the intervention of some compact .... "26 
There is also an evolution of the morals and conduct of society that 
is accomplished on the basis of knowledge and experience.26 This is 
exemplified by the evolution of references to such terms as "wilder-
ness," which have come full-circle: from Old Testament27 references to 
the place where the Israelites sought out the "glory of the Lord,''28 to 
22 See 5A POWELL, supra note 14, ~ 745 (emphasis added). 
23 ROBERT LEO SMITH, ECOLOGY AND FIELD BIOLOGY 29 (1990). 
24 EUGENE P. ODUM, ECOLOGY AND OUR ENDANGERED LIFE-SUPPORT SYSTEMS 13 (1989). 
25 JOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE 165 (W. von Leyden ed., 1954) [hereinafter 
LOCKE]. One basis for this natural instinct is "[c]oncerning morals or action, that is, the 
conformity to be found in the moral conduct of men and in the practice of social life." [d. at 166. 
26 [d. at 179. Locke states that "truly, knowledge precedes general consent, for otherwise the 
same thing would at the same time be cause and effect, and the consent of all would give rise 
to the consent of all, a thing which is plainly absurd." [d. 
27 See generally Jeanne Kay, Concepts of Nature in the Hebrew Bible, 10 ENVTL ETHICS 309 
(1988). "The Hebrew Bible does not even have an equivalent for the generalized English word 
wilderness." [d. at 312 (emphasis added). 
28 Exodus 16:10 (King James). "And it came to pass, as Aaron spake unto the whole congre-
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a place of the devil,29 and "earthy realm of the powers of evil,"30 then 
as the new frontier to be "conquered,"31 and finally as a refuge, "that 
same raw stuff is something to be loved and cherished, because it 
gives definition and meaning to his life."32 It is arguable that the 
"physical" facts (as evidenced by the findings of the science of ecology) 
and the "social" facts (environmental ethics) of the time and place now 
mandate alteration of the characteristics of the possessory estate to 
encompass the ideals of stewardship.33 Stewardship involves a respon-
sibility to the land and an obligation to future generations to preserve 
the life-support systems that perpetuate life. 
The first section of this Article will attempt to analyze the law of 
property and its underlying conceptual base by an historical review 
of its evolution.34 The historical review, limited to the development of 
contemporary concepts in American property law, will discuss and 
contrast the development of real property ownership law in connec-
tion with the physical and social developments which parallel it, and 
include the effect of emerging philosophical notions and scientific 
developments that fostered that development. The purpose of that 
review is to determine if there is any place within the law of real 
property for stewardship of land. 
gation of the children of Israel, that they looked toward the wilderness, and, behold, the glory 
of the LORD appeared in the cloud." Id. 
29 Matthew 4:1 (King James). "Then was Jesus led up of the spirit into the wilderness to be 
tempted of the devil." Id. 
30 RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 17 (1967). 
31 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 387-88 (1836). "The original English 
emigrants came to this country with no slight confidence ... in their right to possess, subdue 
and cultivate the American wilderness, as being, by the law of nature and the gift of Providence, 
open and common to the first occupants in the character of cultivators of the earth." Id. 
32 ALDO LEOPOLD, SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 2644i5 (1966). 
33 Powell lists the historical changes that have evolved in the possessory interest in real 
property. 5A POWELL, supra note 14, ~ 746. 
34 Harvard Law Professor Robert C. Clark noted a seven-step method "for the construction 
and validation of a full, formal study and explanation of a line of legal evolution." Robert C. 
Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1256 (1981). The 
seven steps are: 
1. Define the trend; 
2. Identify starting points; 
3. Identify principles of development, the "motor of change;" 
4. Identify relevant conditions of development; 
5. Put the explanation together; 
6. Consider contrary facts and arguments; 
7. Do thought experiments on the explanatory factors, and when feasible, test the 
results against the evidence. 
Id. at 1256-59. This Article will attempt to address each of these seven steps. 
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The second section is devoted to environmental ethics, and is fo-
cused on the adoption of those values into contemporary American 
culture. The third section discusses the tools that the science of ecol-
ogy affords us in making our societal values into public policy and into 
law. The fourth section develops the theory of "green wood" and its 
place in property and environmental law. 
A. The Development of American Property Law 
The evolution of American property law has been a dynamic proc-
ess,36 driven from without by pressures that congealed to foster the 
growth of a nation.36 "Perhaps the extension of the property doctrine 
may be best explained by a tendency of the post-revolutionary gen-
eration to equate the protection of property with the preservation of 
liberty."37 It is noteworthy that neither the Articles of Confederation 
nor the U.S. Constitution altered the English system of tenures that 
were adopted by the Colonies; in fact in the Treaty of 1794, British 
subjects then holding lands in the United States were allowed to 
continue to hold them "according to the nature and tenure of their 
respective estates and titles therein."38 Nevertheless, in New York, 
for example, it wasn't until 1830 that the legislature abolished "ten-
ure" and declared all lands to be "allodial."39 "The post revolutionary 
35 See generally HORWITZ 1780-1860, supra note 20; HORWITZ 1870-1960, supra note 20. 
36 A serious debate is ongoing concerning how and to what extent changes in real property 
law have come about. In examining property law by focusing on water law, Alan Watson writes: 
"In the common law, prescription was needed at some times for the acquisition of water rights, 
notably, perhaps, in England of Luttrel's Case [76 Eng. Rep. 1065,4 Coke 86a (K.B. 1600)] and 
in the United States after 1818. At other times and for other judges or writers, priority of use 
was sufficient for the acquisition of the right. In that light it is very difficult to claim that 
particular economic circumstances dictated the nature of the legal rules." Alan Watson, The 
Transformation of American Property Law: A Comparative Law Approach, 24 GA. L. REV. 
163,217 (1990). Watson looks elsewhere for the cause of the changes. 
For a sound explanation of the causes of change in any branch of the law at any time 
in America (or elsewhere), it is necessary to consider both the antecedents of the law 
and any other legal system which may have been influential, and also to examine (for 
patterns of similarity or difference in change) the same branch of the law in other legal 
systems which were subject to different economic, social and political conditions. 
[d. (footnote omitted). See also KENT, supra note 31, at 441--48. 
37 WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL 
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 126 (1975). 
38 Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. 453, 463 (1819). 
39 Robert L. Fowler, The Modern Law of Real Property in New York, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 
167 (1901). I Rev. Stat. (N.Y.), Part II, Chap. I, § 3 (1836) (repealed), reads as follows: "All lands 
within this state are declared to be allodial, so that subject only to the liability to escheat, the 
entire and absolute property is vested in the owners, according to the nature of their respective 
354 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:347 
rules allocating property did not result in increased individual liberty; 
they merely identified the individuals who would enjoy it."40 Chancel-
lor James Kent (1763-1847), the American Blackstone, wrote: 
In England, the right of alienation of land was long checked by 
the oppressive restraints of the feudal system, and the doctrine 
of entailments. All those embarrassments have been effectively 
removed in this country; and the right to acquire, to hold, to enjoy, 
to alien, to devise and to transmit property by inheritance ... is 
enjoyed in the fullness and perfection of the absolute right. Every 
individual has as much freedom in the acquisition, use, and dispo-
sition of his property, as is consistent with good order, and the 
reciprocal rights of others.41 
According to Kent, the extension of this was that government in 
America could not regulate private property "by sumptuary laws,42 
or any other visionary schemes of frugality and equality."43 Kent 
recognized the government's right to regulate for other purposes: "So, 
it is lawful to raze houses to the ground to prevent the spreading of 
a conflagration."" "Property, like liberty, has been taught that some 
of its most cherished immunities are not absolute, but relative."45 The 
property owner was protected by nuisance law that was based upon 
priority of use. 
A post revolutionary plaintiff could thus recover damages for a 
nuisance if a defendant built a stable, a blacksmith shop, or a 
factory that emitted noxious smells next to an existing dwelling 
house or town, if he polluted the water on or adjacent to the 
estates; and all feudal tenures, or very description, with all their incidents, are abolished." The 
term "allodial" is from "allodium," defined as "[l]and held absolutely in one's own right, and not 
of any lord or superior." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 76 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLACK'S]. The 
"alOO" was ''in some sense a bundle of rights and property .... " FREDERIC SEEBOHM, TRIBAL 
CUSTOM IN ANGLO-SAXON LAW 153 (1911). 
40 See SEEBOHM, 8Upra note 39, at 153. 
41 KENT, 8Upra note 31, at 327-28. 
42 "Laws made for the purpose of restraining luxury or extravagance .... " BLACK'S, supra 
note 39, at 1436. 
43 KENT, supra note 31, at 329. 
44ld. at 338-39. See also Russell v. Mayor & City of New York, 2 Denio (N.Y.) 461 (1845). 
The best elementary writers lay down the principle, and adjudication upon adjudication 
have for centuries sustained, sanctioned and upheld it, that in a case of actual necessity, 
to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, or any other great public 
calamity, the private property of any individuals may be lawfully destroyed for the 
relief, protection or safety of the many without subjecting the actors to personal 
responsibility for the damages which the owners has sustained. 
ld. at 474. 
45 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 131 (1928). 
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plaintiff's existing estate, causing the water to emit noxious 
smells, pollute the plaintiffs well, or be otherwise unfit for con-
tinued use; if by constructing a drain or a necessary house, by 
failing to make due repair to this property, or by placing gravel 
on his land he caused noxious water to flow onto plaintiffs land; 
if he obstructed the plaintiffs ancient drain, as a result the water 
flowed back onto plaintiffs land; or if he drained a nearby pond, 
causing the plaintiffs immemorial well to dry Up.46 
355 
With regard to vacant land or "commons," American law followed 
in the British tradition. "According to the theory of the British con-
stitution, all vacant lands47 are vested in the crown .... [T]his princi-
ple was as fully recognised in America as in the island of Great 
Britain."46 
In this country we have adopted the same principle, and applied 
it to our republican governments; and it is a settled and funda-
mental doctrine with us, that all valid individual title to land 
within the United States, is derived from the grant of our own 
local governments, or from that of the United States, or from the 
Crown, or royal-chartered governments established here prior to 
the revolution.49 
Where the American Revolution (1776-1781) precipitously removed 
the king from the property-ownership formula, there occurred a vac-
uum, and into that vacuum we have siphoned, based on the Fifth 
Amendment,50 the burgeoning concept of property rights.51 Nulle 
terre sans seigneur-there is no land without a lord.52 The king was 
no longer the protector of nature.53 
46 NELSON, supra note 37, at 121 (footnotes omitted). 
47 "So far as respected the authority of the crown, no distinction was taken between vacant 
lands and lands occupied by the Indians." Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 596 (1823). 
48 [d. at 595. 
49 KENT, supra note 31, at 377-78. 
60 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentation or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken far public use, without just compensation. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
51 D.R. DENMAN, ORIGINS OF OwNERSHIP 79 (1958). 
62 [d. at 80. 
63 It is noted that in 1273, King Edward I (1272-1307) issued a decree prohibiting burning of 
"sea-coal" in order to protect the health of his subjects. RICHARD BURNETT-HALL, ENVIRON-
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"The revolutionary government by resolutions simply transferred 
the 'seigniory' and the 'quit rents' of the Crown to the political ab-
straction called the State."M The common law forced the adoption of 
the phantom king in U.S. law acting in the public interest.56 "The 
State, as quasi-sovereign and representative of the interest of the 
public, has a standing in court to protect the atmosphere, the water 
and the forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or dis-
sent of the private owners of the land most immediately concerned."66 
This is also related in the doctrine of parens patriae. 
The concept of parens patriae is derived from the English consti-
tutional system. As the system developed from its feudal begin-
nings, the King retained certain duties and powers, which were 
referred to as the "royal prerogative." These powers and duties 
were said to be exercised by the King in his capacity as "father 
of the country." ... In the United States, the "royal prerogative" 
and the "parens patriae" function of the King passed to the 
States.57 
The common law in the United States developed the legal concept of 
a state public trust, which was engendered in the Supreme Court's 
1896 decision in Geer v. Connecticut.58 That role was later filled to 
MENTAL LAW 1 (1995); SUSAN WOLF & ANNA WHITE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3 (1995); see 
generally ROSALIND MALCOLM, A GUIDEBOOK TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1994). In 1609, King 
James I outlawed the burning of heaths and moors due to the effect of the fires on fowl and 
game, and the general fouling of the air. "Forasmuch as thereby happeneth yerelie a greate 
distruccion of the Broode of Wildfoule and Mooregame, and by the Multitude of grosse Vapours 
and Cloudes arrising from those greate Fyers, the Aire is soe distempered and such unseason-
able and unnatural Stormes are ingendred .... " 7 JAC. I. c. 17 (1609) in IV STATUTES OF THE 
REALM 1172 (Hein ed. 1993). 
64 Fowler, BUpra note 39, at 167. 
65 See generally Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes 
the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 195-201 (1980). 
66 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 354 (1908) (citing Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907), and Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 141--42 (1902». 
67 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
The nature of the parens patriae suit has been greatly expanded in the United States 
beyond that which existed in England. This expansion was first evidenced in Louisi-
ana v. Thxas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900), a case in which the State of Louisiana brought suit to 
enjoin officials of the State of Texas from so administering the Texas quarantine 
regulations as to prevent Louisiana merchants from sending goods into Texas. This 
Court recognized that Louisiana was attempting to sue, not because of any particular 
injury to a business of the State, but as parens patriae for all her citizens. While the 
Court found that parens patriae could not properly be invoked in that case, the 
propriety and utility of parens patriae suits were clearly recognized. 
[d. at 257--58. 
68 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). The issue was whether the state had the power 
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some degree by the federal government in Kleppe v. New Mexico69 
and Hughes v. Oklahoma.60 
The traditional principles of the public trust doctrine are: (1) all 
tidelands and lands under navigable water were owned by the 
original thirteen states at the time of the American Revolution, 
as successors in sovereignty to the English Crown, and each 
subsequent state was endowed with similar ownership rights at 
the time of its admission into the Union; (2) the states own these 
lands subject to a "public trust" for the benefit of all their citizens 
with respect to certain rights of usage, particularly uses relating 
to maritime commerce, navigation, and fishing; and (3) all lawful 
grants of such lands by a state to private owners have been made 
subject to that trust and to the state's obligation to protect the 
public interest from any use that would SUbstantially impair the 
trust. Moreover, any such conveyed lands must be used by their 
private owner so as to promote the public interest and so as not 
to interfere unduly with the public's several rights under the 
public trust doctrine.61 
to regulate the killing of game within its borders. See id. at 522. Under the state public trust 
doctrine, a state has the exclusive right of regulating wildlife within its jurisdiction. See id. at 
522-23; see also Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes wrote: 
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that 
capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, 
in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its 
mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. 
It might have to pay individuals before it could utter that word, but with it remains 
the final power. 
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237. See generally Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 
209 U.S. 349 (1908). The "State Ownership Doctrine" was later repudiated in Kleppe v. New 
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 535-47 (1976), and overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-39 
(1979). It is well noted that the Hughes Court limited the general rule in that case to "make 
ample allowance for preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, the 
legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild animals .... " Hughes, 441 
U.S. at 335-36. Quoting from its decision in H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mand, 336 U.S. 525, 537 
(1949), the Court made clear that "States may promote this legitimate purpose only in ways 
consistent with the basic principle that our economic unit is the Nation .... " H.P. Hood & Sons, 
Inc., 336 U.S. at 338-39. 
69 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 535-47 (recognizing a wider ecological basis for wildlife protection and 
repudiating "State Public Trust" doctrine, under Property Clause of the Constitution). 
60 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 326-35 (overruling Geer, based on Commerce Clause and noting that 
Geer was decided ''relatively early in the evolutionary process" of rules to accommodate state 
and federal interests). 
61 JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S 
COASTS 3-4 (1994) (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 184 U.S. 77,94 
(1902). "The title to submerged lands resting in the State, are held in trust in aid of navigation. 
Courts have at all times been diligent to protect and enforce rights of navigation, in aiding and 
protecting whatever may tend to build up and encourage commerce upon the seas." See id. See 
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Much of the change that occurred in the law of real property during 
the nineteenth century was the result of choices that were made 
between conflicting uses of private property. Legal historian Morton 
J. Horwitz points to a three-stage process relating the development 
of U.S. property law on conflicting uses.62 He identifies the first stage, 
one in which the "right to prevent others from using their property 
in an injurious manner, regardless of the social utility of a particular 
course of conduct," is the definition ofland ownership.63 "By the 1760s, 
however, the rules allocating central control over scarce resources to 
the first user appear to have impeded economic growth and effi-
ciency."64 
The second stage, Horwitz postUlates, was the result of the "anti-
competitive results" of the failure of property law to recognize the 
social utility of a course of conduct.65 This stage manifested itself in 
the courts' balancing of "reciprocal rights and duties."66 After the Civil 
War, to nurture the burgeoning Industrial Revolution, the balancing 
of the social utility of a course of conduct with the rights of adjacent 
property owners drastically tilted toward the third stage, which 
granted a landowner "an absolute right to engage in any conduct on 
one's property regardless of its economic value."67 
The changes that continued into the latter part of the nineteenth 
century were less practical and more theoretical in nature. The con-
cept of property as "things," also referred to as the "physicalist" 
concept, dominated the definitions of property and were bolstered by 
Blackstone's imprimatur. Nevertheless, in each definition, there was 
an implicit recognition of the importance of the rights to the property 
and some notion that the thing and the rights were theoretically 
divisible. The concept is apparent from an 1856 New York Court of 
Appeals case, Wynehamer v. People, which successfully challenged a 
state law enacted to "prevent intemperance" as violative of the state 
constitution's prohibition against taking property.68 The court in defin-
ing property wrote: 
generally James L. Huffman, A Fish out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitu-
tional Democracy, 19 ENVT'L L. 527 (1989). 
62 See HORWITZ, 1780-1860, supra note 20, at 101-{)2. 
63 See id. at 102 (emphasis added). 
64 NELSON, supra note 37, at 53. 
65 See HOROWITZ 1780-1860, supra note 20, at 102. 
66 [d. 
67 [d. Watson argues that "[tlhe notion of property in land just did not correspond to Horwitz' 
description of absolute dominion." Watson, supra note 36, at 188. 
63 Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). 
1998] ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
material objects, therefore are property in the true sense, because 
they are impressed by the laws and usages of society with certain 
qualities, among which are, fundamentally, the right of the occu-
pant or owner to use and enjoy them exclusively, and his absolute 
power to sell and dispose of them; and as property consists in the 
artificial impression of these qualities upon material things, so, 
whatever removes the impression destroys the notion of property, 
although the things themselves may remain physically un-
touched.69 
359 
Despite these changes in theory, limitations on certain uses remained. 
In the landmark case of Mugler v. Kansas, the Supreme Court made 
the bold statement that: 
[t]he principle, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process oflaw, was embodied, in substance, 
in the constitutions of nearly all, if not all, of the States at the time 
of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment; and it has never 
been regarded as incompatible with the principle, equally vital, 
because essential to the peace and safety of society, that all prop-
erty in this country is held under the implied obligation that the 
owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community.70 
In Mugler, the Court equates the obligation that property not be 
used in an injurious manner with the principle of due process of law.71 
This case held that a noxious use, the operation of a brewery, could 
be prohibited by law, and the owner whose use was restricted was 
entitled to no compensation.72 This case raises the question of what 
constitutes a "noxious" use.73 In 1887, the use of property as a brewery 
in the state of Kansas was considered a noxious use; today, with the 
predominance of brew-pubs, such a use is accepted if not favored.74 
When it was first patented in 1939, dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane 
was considered a modern miracle.76 Only 23 years later this noxious 
chemical, nicknamed DDT, was vilified in the book Silent Spring,76 and 
later banned for use in the U.S.77 These examples, and many more 
69 [d. at 396. 
70 MugJer v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887). 
71 See id. at 657. 
72 See id. at 669-71. 
78 See id. 
74 See Sarah Wiese, Things Are Brewin' in Lawrence, ToPEKA CAPITAL J., Mar. 15, 1996, at 
C1. In fact the little town of Lawrence, Kansas, boasts three brew-pubs! See id. 
76 Medical Research: Hearings Before U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Wartime Health and Educ., 
78th Congo 2178 (Dec. 14, 1944) (testimony of Brig. Gen. James S. Simmons, Chief, Preventative 
Med. Serv., Office of the Surgeon Gen., U.S. Army). 
76 See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
77 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 7 U.S.C. §§ 136--136y (1972). 
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equally poignant, demonstrate the evolutionary (and sometimes revo-
lutionary) movement in our society between what is tolerable and 
what is intolerable. The importance of this to the discussion herein is 
in the understanding that societal values do evolve, and the laws must 
follow. In the case of real property, environmental values have taken 
hold, and must become the basis for changes in the law. 
Changes in the law of property have also reflected a clear paradigm 
shift from the treatment of property as rights unrelated to the thing. 
A paradigm shift of this magnitude must be put in perspective with 
other shifts of comparable weight. The shift that bears significant 
similarity and relatedness to the thesis herein is the movement from 
the Lochner v. New York Court's ruling on labor laws78 to its concep-
tual reversal in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.79 Both the Lochner Court 
and the West Coast Hotel Court applied essentially the same law to 
the factual situations presented, but reached conclusions that were 
inapposite.80 Citing Mugler, the Lochner Court noted that "[b]oth 
property and liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may 
be imposed by the governing power of the State in the exercise of 
those powers, and with such conditions the Fourteenth Amendment 
was not designed to interfere."81 West Coast Hotel similarly contains 
the statement that "[l]iberty under the Constitution is thus necessar-
ily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is 
reasonable in relation to its subjects and is adopted in the interests 
of the community is due process."82 
The Lochner case dealt with a New York statute that limited the 
hours that employees were allowed to work in a bakery to sixty per 
week or ten per day.83 The Court found that this law was unconstitu-
tional, holding that "[t]here was no reasonable ground for interfering 
with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determining 
the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker."84 The Lochner Court 
first reconciled a perverse dichotomy85 with the case of Petit v. Min-
78 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1908). For an excellent treatment of Lochner and its 
implications for contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's 
Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 880 (1987). See generally PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND 
REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK (1990); Molly S. McUsic, The 
Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. 
L. REV. 605 (1996). 
79 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937). 
80 See generally Sunstein, supra note 78. 
81 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
82 West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391. 
B3 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52. 
84 Id. at 57. 
85 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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nesota, holding that the legislature had the right to declare that, as a 
matter of law, keeping barber shops open on Sunday was not a work 
of necessity or charity as a proper exercise of the police power relat-
ing to the observance of Sunday.86 The absurdity of the Court's con-
clusion that Sunday observance was a legitimate exercise of police 
power, but a labor law regulating the amount of hours a bakery 
worker could labor in the hot oppressive atmosphere of the bakery 
was not, is enlightening. It is clear that the swaying factor in these 
two cases were the values that were drawn from society at the time. 
The Supreme Court drew a line that it felt was warranted. "The 
central problem of the Lochner Court had to do with its conceptions 
of neutrality and inaction and its choice of appropriate baseline."87 
One view of Lochner is that West Coast Hotel merely redraws the 
baseline, and doesn't overrule the Lochner logic. Indeed, both Courts' 
remarks concerning liberty and its limitations are basically inter-
changeable. West Coast Hotel considered a Washington State mini-
mum wage law for women, which it upheld.86 "The community is not 
bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable em-
ployers. The community may direct its law-making power to correct 
the abuse which springs from their selfish disregard of the public 
interest."89 
The Lochner case was decided in 1905, and the West Coast Hotel 
case in 1937.90 The West Coast Hotel Court took judicial notice of the 
Depression and "the unparalleled demands for relief which arose 
during the recent period of depression and still continue to an alarm-
ing extent despite the degree of economic recovery which has been 
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is 
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that 
a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would 
infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our 
people and our law. 
[d. at 76. 
86 See Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 168 (1900). 
We have uniformly recognized state laws relating to the observance of Sunday as 
enacted in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. The subject was 
fully considered in Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, and it is unnecessary to go 
over the ground again. It was there said: "The legislature having, as will not be 
disputed, power to enact laws to promote the order and to secure the comfort, happi-
ness and health of the people, it was within its discretion to fix the day when all labor, 
within the limits of the State, works of necessity and charity excepted, should cease." 
[d. at 165. 
87 Sunstein, supra note 78, at 883. 
88 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937). 
89 [d. 
90 See id. 
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achieved."91 It is this allusion by the Court that alerts the reader to a 
judicial activism that distinguishes West Coast Hotel from Lochner 
and is representative of a paradigm change. In one sense the need for 
activism not only motivated the later Court to move the baseline, it 
also minimized neutrality.92 
What does the nature of the Lochner paradigm shift say for the 
overall evolution of real property law? The shift heightens the sense 
of the role of societal values, and vindicates those who advocate 
moving the baseline to accommodate ecology and environmental eth-
ics. The environmental revolution parallels the Depression in terms 
of the focus of purpose that has occurred. The Depression focused the 
mechanisms of law on recovery.93 The environmental revolution has 
already focused the mechanisms of law on regulatory methods, which 
would have been unthinkable during the Depression, and even more 
so during the Lochner era. 
In defining the limits of what would become known as "property 
rights" Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: 
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical 
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of prin-
ciples of policy which are other than those on which the particular 
right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their 
own when a certain point is reached. The limits set to property 
by other public interests present themselves as a branch of what 
is called the police power of the State. The boundary at which the 
conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any general 
formula in advance, but points in the line, or helping to establish 
it, are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case falls on 
the nearer or farther side. For instance, the police power may 
limit the height of buildings, in a city, without compensation. To 
that extent it cuts down what otherwise would be the rights of 
property. But if it should attempt to limit the height so far as to 
make an ordinary building lot wholly useless, the rights of prop-
erty would prevail over the other public interest, and the police 
power would fail. To set such a limit would need compensation and 
the power of eminent domain.94 
This statement recognizes the inherent limitation to property rights. 
Holmes also wrote that "[i]t sometimes is difficult to fix boundary 
stones between the private right of property and the police power 
when, as in the case at bar, we know of few decisions that are very 
91 [d. at 399. 
92 See Sunstein, supra note 78, at 917. 
93 One would like to add social justice, but this would be reaching. 
1M Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). 
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much in point."95 In fixing boundaries to property rights it is not 
always a clash of property rights versus regulation, but a balance of 
property rights, as Holmes noted: "It constantly is necessary to rec-
oncile and to adjust different constitutional principles, each of which 
would be entitled to possession of the disputed ground but for the 
presence of the others, as we already have said that it is necessary to 
reconcile and to adjust different principles of the common law."96 
1. From Things to Rights 
Under the physicalist concept the law of property was based on a tax-
onomy of things, with the nature of each thing determining its treat-
ment at law.97 
The physicalist definitions of property-such as "the highest right 
a man can have in any thing";98 or the exclusive right of possessing, 
enjoying and disposing of a thing99- began to evolve into one which 
differentiated between the object and the rights. 
In 1893, the Missouri Supreme Court described property as "the 
exclusive right of any person to freely use, enjoy, and dispose of any 
determinate object."lOo The court explained, "sometimes the term is 
applied to the thing itself, as to a horse or a tract of land; these things, 
however, though the subjects of property are, when coupled with 
possession, but the indicia, the visible manifestations of invisible 
rights, 'the evidence of things not seen.m101 
During the late nineteenth century some courts were torn between 
the concept of property as rights or as things. Rigney v. Chicago,l02 
an 1882 takings case before the Supreme Court of Illinois, reflected 
this dichotomy. 
Property in its appropriate sense, means that dominion or in-
definite right of user and disposition which one may lawfully ex-
ercise over particular things or subjects, and generally to the 
exclusion of all others, and doubtless this is substantially the 
sense in which the word is used in the constitution; yet the term 
96 [d. at 355. 
96 [d. at 357. 
97 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of 
the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 331 (1980). 
98 Jackson v. Housel, 17 Johns. 281, 283 (N.Y. 1820). 
99 McKeon v. Bisbee, 9 Cal. 137, 142 (1858). 
100 St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527, 533 (1893). 
101 [d. 
102 Rigney v. Chicago, 102 Ill. 64 (1882). 
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is often used to indicate the res or subject of the property rather 
than the property itself.103 
The subsequent evolution of the meaning of property under U.S. 
property law probably had more to do with the philosophical con-
structs that stimulated debate on the nature of property around the 
turn of the century. The development of abstract theories can be 
identified with the expansion of the ownership of interests in corpo-
rations. "[I]t is clear that in dealing with the modern corporation we 
are not dealing with the old type of private property."l04 The expand-
ing need for the development in capital that was backed by securities 
necessitated a more abstract view of property. 
As the varieties of commercial and intangible property grew 
during the nineteenth century, land slowly receded as the model 
for property conceptions. As the most significant forms of new 
property were incorporeal, judges were pressed to redefine the 
nature of interference with property rights more abstractly, not 
as an invasion of some physical boundary but as any action that 
reduced the market value of property.105 
This manifested itself in the move from a "physicalist" view of prop-
erty to the "abstract" view of legal writers such as Professor Wesley 
N. Hohfeld (1878-1918),1<16 "Blackstone had made clear that property 
could exist only in relation to some thing. Hohfeld rejected even this 
minimal association with tangible objects, arguing that property could 
exist whether or not there was any tangible thing to serve as the 
object of the rights."!07 
The theory behind the view of property as a bundle of rights, how-
ever, is not of such recent origin, and can be said to derive from the 
term universitas juris or universitas iurus (and universitas facti), 
which are "non-Roman terms [that were] coined in the literature to 
distinguish a group of things which though physically separated are 
103 [d. at 77. 
104 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 347 (1932). "In place of actual physical properties over which the owner could 
exercise direction and for which he was responsible, the owner now holds a piece of paper." [d. 
at 66. 
106 HORWITZ, 1870-1960, supra note 20, at 146-47. 
106 [d. at 14fHi7. 
107 Vandevelde, supra note 97, at 360 (citation omitted). The "green wood" metaphor should 
not be seen as a return to the "physicalist" construct of ownership; however, it does recognize 
the innate importance of the "thing" when that "thing" is real property. The failure of the 
abstract theorists to consider the importance of the ''thing'' can only be seen as a reflection of 
their failure to incorporate the ecological principles which have taken shape only recently. 
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treated as a whole."l08 English jurist John Austin (1790-1859) devel-
ops this theory in his lecture (circa 1828-1832): 
§ 997. 1. A status is a set or collection of various rights or duties, 
or of various capacities or incapacities to take or incur rights or 
duties. 2. The rights or duties which are its constituent elements, 
are legal effects or consequences of one investitive fact, of one 
title or mode of acquisition, or, in the usual language of the Roman 
lawyer, of one causa or antecedent. 
§ 998. Now it certainly is true, that a status is a set or collection 
of various rights or duties. And that the rights or duties which 
are its constituent elements, are legal effects or consequences, 
mediately or immediately, of one and the same title or investitive 
fact or event .... But though these two properties belong to every 
status, they will not distinguish status or conditions from those 
rights and duties which are matter for the law of things. 
§ 999. For, first, these properties belong to each of the aggregates 
which are styled by modern civilians universitatis juris; that is to 
say, complex sets or collections of rights and duties .... 
§ 1000. And secondly, the two properties, which, in Bentham's 
opinion, characterize a status or condition, are not even peculiar 
to those aggregates of rights and duties which are styled by 
modern civilians universitas juris. They are found in most or 
many of those numerous rights and duties, which, as contradist-
inguished to universities of rights and duties, are deemed particu-
lar or singular. Take, for example, the right of dominion or prop-
erty in a specifically determined thing; as a horse, a slave, a 
garment, a house, a field, or what not. It is manifest that the right, 
though deemed singular, is truly a collection or aggregate of rights 
which an adequate description would occupy a bulky volume. It 
consists, for example, of the right of exclusive user [sic] or pos-
session; the right of disposing or alienating totally or partially; of 
rights of vindication, and other rights of action, in the event of a 
disturbance of any of those primary rights; and each of these 
rights, which combine to form the right of dominion, may itself be 
resolved into other rights which are less complex .... 109 
That this changeover was gradual is evidenced by an 1882 article in 
The North American Review,llo which expressed frustration that the 
concepts that were germinated by Austin had not taken hold. 
There is nothing more difficult than to effect any change in a legal 
conception once firmly imbedded in a system of jurisprudence, 
108 ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 751 (1953). 
109 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE: OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 
154-57 (Robert Campbell ed., 1875) (emphasis added). 
110 See generally A.G. Sedgwick, Constitutional Protection of Property Rights, 135 N. AM. 
REV. 253 (1882). 
366 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:347 
particularly such a one as ours, in which general principles are 
developed out of adjudicated cases, while each case is, in theory, 
supposed to be founded upon and governed by another precisely 
similar; in which, in fact, there is, in theory, supposed to be no 
change at all. It is not surprising, therefore that we should find 
the conception of "property" prevailing till a very recent period 
in the United States, to be still the same which the word sug-
gested to lawyers of the last century, which Blackstone elaborated 
in his "Commentaries," and which historically may be traced to 
the archaic customs which answered the purpose of law in the 
forests of Germany.111 
While theorists like Austin had begun to conceptualize property as a 
set of rights, the conception of property as things was a durable 
notion. 
The slow metamorphosis of the common law resulted in a duality 
in the meaning of property, a duality that in some sense continues to 
exist today,112 The U.S. Supreme Court in Hamilton v. Rathbone113 
noted that the "word 'property' ... includes every right and interest 
which a person has in lands and chattels, and is broad enough to 
include everything which one person can own and transfer to an-
other."114 In 1909 the duality was patent from a definition in a legal 
encyclopedia: "property includes whatever things may be the subject 
of ownership, and all rights, titles and interests therein."115 
2. History of the Bundle Metaphors 
The ''bundle of rights" metaphor is generally attributed either to 
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo (1870-1938)116 or Profes-
sor Hohfeld,117 although it is questionable that either actually first 
111 Id. at 257-58. Sedgwick noted that "[tlhe word 'property' we find used in Blackstone to 
express these two entirely distinct ideas: first, the thing owned, and secondly, the entire 
aggregate of rights and obligations with relation to it imposed by the law upon the owner." Id. 
112 The dualistic approach today, however, is divided between the popular view of property, 
which still regards it as the "thing," and the "sophisticated" view, which regards it wholly as 
rights. 
113 Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414 (1899). 
114 I d. at 421. 
115 32 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 651 (William Mack ed., 1909). 
116 "In the late 1920s, Justice Cardozo first promulgated the notion that property ownership 
is analogous to ownership of a bundle of sticks." Michelle Andrea Wenzel, Comment, The Model 
Surface Use and Mineral Development Accommodation Act: Easy Easements for Mining 
Interests, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 607, 609 n.4 (1993). See also Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 
23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1055-63 (1989). 
117 "In its conventional formulation, the bundle of rights thesis is a combination of Wesley 
Hohfeld's analysis of rights and A.M. Honore's description of the incidents of ownership." J.E. 
Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1996). 
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coined that phrase, used it as a legal metaphor,118 or applied it to 
property.119 The first use of this term appears in the 1888 Treatise on 
the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States by John Lewis 
(1842-1921).120 "The dullest individual among the people knows and 
understands that his property in anything is a bundle of rightS."121 
Nevertheless, both Hohfeldl22 and Cardozol23 had great influence on 
its ultimate application as the dominant paradigml24 for the meaning 
of property.l26 "The most important consequence of Hohfeld's system 
of classification was that it carried through the radical implications of 
liB The metaphor of ''bundle of rights" was used in the 1888 case of Compton v. Railway Co., 
45 Ohio St. 592, 616 (1888) as follows: "The term [universitas juris] expresses the legal concep-
tion of a university or bundle of rights and liabilities, belonging to one person and constituting, 
as it were, his legal personality .... " This concept was echoed in the 1896 New York case of 
Upington v. ClYI'rigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 150 (1896) (citing Nicoll v. New York & Erie R.R. Co., 12 
N.Y. 121 (1854». 
119 One of the earliest references to the ''bundle of rights" purely as a property metaphor was 
in the brief for the defendant-in-error (Alfred B. Benedict and Jerome D. Creed, on the brief) 
in the case of Cincinnati Volksblatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, 62 Ohio St. 189, 194-95 (1900): "All 
property is rights. Blackstone, Vol. I, p. 138. Property, then, is a right; and a shareholder's 
property right in a corporation is his bundle of rights, including the right to inspect its books. 
It cannot be successfully denied that the sum total of the shareholder's rights make up his stock, 
his property in the corporation." 
120 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 57 
(1888). The Supreme Court of Missouri refers to Lewis as "[a]n eminent text-writer in his 
recognized and widely quoted treatise on the subject of Eminent Domain." Morgan v. Willman, 
318 Mo. 151, 164 (1927). There is no doubt that Lewis' treatise was influential; it was cited as 
early as 1889 by counsel before the Court of Appeals of New York in Mayor, Aldermen & 
Commonalty of New York v. Carleton, 113 N.Y. 284, 286 (1889); and by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1897 in the case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 245 
(1897); as well as in hundreds of cases since. However, there is no indication in case law that 
Lewis' "bundle of rights" metaphor was relied upon. The appearance of the metaphor in Lewis 
seems to highlight how the competing theories of property were advancing in the late nine-
teenth century; as the physicalist approach waned, the bundle theory took hold. 
121 LEWIS, supra note 120, at 57 (emphasis added). 
122 "Suppose, for example, that A is fee-simple owner of Blackacre. His 'legal interest' or 
'property' relating to the tangible object that we call land consists of a complex aggregate of 
rights (or claims), privileges, powers, and immunities." WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDA-
MENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL 
ESSAYS 96 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923). "Some say that an owner has a bundle of rights 
against various people. Yale's great legal analyst, Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld, refined this 
notion further by describing ownership as an aggregate of rights, powers, privileges, and 
immunities, and minutely defining and analyzing each of these." A. JAMES CASNER & W. 
BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 72 n.1 (1969) (noting that "Hohfeld's gift of 
expression was not felicitous, but his ideas were restated with great effect by Professor Corbin 
in Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919». 
123 See generally Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933). 
124 See Penner, supra note 117, at 713. 
126 The Supreme Court identified "incidents" of ownership in Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 
124, 137 (1929). 
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a de-physicalized system of property. Property consisted of abstract 
legal relations, not physical things, Hohfeld showed."126 
In Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway v. Wallace, the 
Supreme Court held that "[t]he power to tax property, the sum of all 
the rights and powers incident to ownership, necessarily includes the 
power to tax its constituent elements."127 Soon thereafter in Henne-
ford v. Silas Mason,12i3 the opinion by Justice Benjamin Cardozo con-
tains an early reference to the sticks ("faggots") in the bundle: 
Things acquired or transported in interstate commerce may be 
subjected to a property tax, non-discriminatory in its operation, 
when they have become part of the common mass of property 
within the state of destination. This is so, indeed, though they are 
still in the original packages. For like reasons they may be sub-
jected, when once they are at rest, to a non-discriminatory tax 
upon use or enjoyment. The privilege of use is only one attribute, 
among many, of the bundle of privileges that make up property 
or ownership. A state is at liberty, if it pleases, to tax them all 
collectively, or to separate the faggots and lay the charge distribu-
tively.l29 
In Steward Machine v. Davis/SO Justice Cardozo, writing for the 
Court, pointed out that "[i]ndeed, ownership itself, as we had occasion 
to point out the other day, is only a bundle of rights and privileges 
invested with a single name. Henneford v. Silas Mason, 300 U.S. 
577."131 The metaphor ''bundle of sticks" is apparently derived from 
the Aesop's fable of the same name.132 As such, the bundle of sticks 
126 HORWITZ, 1870--1960, supra note 20, at 156, citing Vandevelde, supra note 97, at 359-ti2. 
127 Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry., 288 U.S. at 267-ti8. 
128 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1936). 
129 [d. at 582 (citations omitted). 
130 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
181 [d. at 581. 
132 The phrase ''bundle of sticks" is most often attributed to Aesop's fable: "The Father and 
His Sons" (also called ''The Bundle of Sticks"): 
A father had a family of sons who were perpetually quarreling among themselves. 
When he failed to heal their disputes by his exhortations, he determined to give them 
a practical illustration of the evils of disunion; and for this purpose he one day told 
them to bring him a bundle of sticks. When they had done so, he placed the faggot into 
the hands of each of them in succession, and ordered them to break it in pieces. They 
tried with all their strength, and were not able to do it. He next opened the faggot, 
took the sticks separately, one by one, and again put them into his sons' hands, upon 
which they broke them easily. He then addressed them in these words: "My sons, if 
you are of one mind, and unite to assist each other, you will be as this faggot, uninjured 
by all the attempts of your enemies; but if you are divided among yourselves, you will 
be broken as easily as these sticks." 
AEsop, FABLES (George Fyler 'Ibwnsend ed., 1993). The Rev. George Fyler 'Ibwnsend did a 
literal translation of 300 of Aesop's Fables circa 1870 and 350 in 1882. The fable ''The Father 
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metaphor was first applied to evidentiary matters involving proof by 
circumstantial evidence.l33 Cardozo seemingly ties the two together 
in his 1928 book The Paradoxes of Legal Science: "The bundle of 
power and privileges to which we give the name ownership is not 
constant through the ages. The faggots must be put together and 
rebound from time to time."l34 However, the legal metaphor of ''bundle 
of faggots" antedates Cardozo's reference by almost 75 years. In the 
case of United States v. Cole,135 the court wrote "[w]e might not be 
able, and certainly cannot be required to break this entire bundle of 
faggots, which government has tied so industriously together."136 
While property law in the U.S. may have wavered between the 
varying philosophical constructs,137 it seems clear that the prevalent 
concept is based on the abstraction of rights and duties, which has 
grown in favor by the Supreme Court since the 1930s.138 It is neces-
and His Sons" appears in the 1882 edition. It is interesting to note that the appearance of the 
''bundle of sticks" metaphor first appears in cases shortly thereafter. See generally AEsop, 
THREE HUNDRED AESOP'S FABLES, LITERAL TRANSLATION BY GEORGE FYLER ToWNSEND 
(1882); AESOP, THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY AESOP'S FABLES, LITERALLY TRANSLATED FROM 
THE GREEK BY REV. GEORGE FYLER ToWNSEND (1882). For a history of this fable, see AEsop, 
THE FABLES OF AESOP, SELECTED, ToLD ANEW AND THEIR HISTORY TRACED (Joseph Jacobs 
ed., 1894) (similar apologues are told of Ghengis Khan and of a king of Scythia) (citations 
omitted). 
An interesting aside on the use of the term "bundle of sticks" is its Latin translation, fasciB, 
which is defined as "a bundle (esp. of sticks, etc.), faggot" in OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 677 
(P.G.W. Glare ed., 1982); and ''bundle of sticks with an ax projecting," in D.P. SIMPSON, 
CASSELL'S NEW LATIN DICTIONARY 241 (1959). The word fascia is also the root of the word 
Fascist, and the symbol of the Fascists in Italy was a bundle of sticks with an ax protruding, 
which was taken from an ancient Roman symbol of legal authority. 
133 See generally In re Disbarment v. Catron, 8 N.M. 253, 320 (1895) (Laughlin, J., dissenting) 
(that circumstantial evidence ''taken together, is sufficient, is well illustrated by the old fable 
that a bundle of sticks is stronger than any single stick"); Estate of Sheehan, 139 Pa. 168, 181 
(1891) (circumstantial evidence ''bound together like the familiar bundle of sticks',); Montgomery 
Web Co. v. Dienelt, 133 Pa. 585, 595 (1890) (cumulative force of circumstantial proof as "bundle 
of twigs"); Cox v. Commonwealth, 125 Pa. 94, 103 (1889) (circumstantial evidence in a criminal 
case as ''bundle of sticks''). 
184 CARDOZO, supra note 45, at 129. 
135 United States v. Cole, 25 F. Cas. 493 (Cir. Ct. D. Ohio 1853). 
136 Id. at 510. 
137 See generally Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929). 
138 Recently, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he difference to petitioner, of course, is the 
loss of her ability to exclude others. As we have noted, this right to exclude others is 'one of 
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'" 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994). State courts have adopted the metaphor: The 
Supreme Court of Utah wrote: 
[i]n that connection it should be borne in mind that in addition to the right of peaceable 
possession of his property the owner has quite a number of other rights and privileges 
which he should be able to exercise without limitation or restraint, including in the air 
above and the earth beneath. They are sometimes referred to as a ''bundle of rights" 
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sary to examine contemporary concepts in property law to under-
stand the implications of those rights and duties. 
III. CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTS IN PROPERTY LAW 
There are four basic concepts that must be analyzed to understand 
how ecology and environmental ethics fit into the current state of 
property law: (1) the basis of property; (2) the meaning of property; 
(3) the incidents of property ownership; and (4) the nature and extent 
of the estate-the title. Since this analysis does not entail a justifica-
tion of property, the basis of property is not discussed herein.139 The 
meaning of property is of importance since the green wood thesis 
directly affects the purely abstract definition that resulted from 
Hohfeld's analysis. The incidents of ownership are closely tied to the 
meaning of property, and have become the favored construct of prop-
erty under the law. The meaning and extent of title is a point of 
departure, from which the lesser estates can be factored into the 
meaning of property, and the appropriate incidents of property can 
be applied. 
and compared to a bundle of sticks, each of which may be violated, removed, or dealt 
with separately. 
Provo City Corp. v. Knudsen, 558 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). 
The Supreme Court of Florida wrote that "[a]s in many other areas of property law, the law 
recognizes various degrees of legal rights and interests in the same property and does not 
demand that one person hold the entire 'bundle of sticks.'" Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 492 So. 2d 339, 348 (Fla. 1986). 
In Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals wrote: 
[o]wnership is often referred to in legal philosophy as a bundle of sticks or rights and 
one or more of the sticks may be separated from the bundle and the bundle will still 
be considered ownership. What combination of rights less than the whole bundle will 
constitute ownership is a question which must be determined in each case in the 
context of the purpose of the determination. In this case for exemption one needs more 
than the title stick to constitute ownership. 
De Byle's, Inc. v. City of Rhinelander, No. 87-0784, 1988 WL 36778, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 
1988) (citation omitted). 
The Supreme Court of Oregon wrote: 
[b ]ecause the ownership of real property is divisible in so many ways, a real property 
owner often is described as holding a ''bundle of sticks." The portion of the ''bundle of 
sticks" retained by the vendor in a land sale contract includes two large sticks: (1) the 
right to receive contract payments, and (2) the legal title in the property securing the 
purchaser's obligation to make the contract payments, with the "concomitant possibil-
ity of resuming general ownership of the land upon default." 
Bedortha v. Sunridge Land Co., Inc., 822 P.2d 694, 696 (Or. 1991) (citing Lacy, Behind and 
Beyond the 1975 Legi8lation on Creditors of Vendors, 55 OR. L. REV. 227, 231 (1976) (footnote 
omitted». 
189 For a thorough philosophical analysis of the justification of property rights, see Becker, 
supra note 18, at 190. 
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A. The Meaning of Property 
It may suggest also that, in many cases, the existence of a well specified 
and generally accepted definition of property is far more important 
than just what the definition is. 
-Milton Friedman (1962)140 
The prevalent metaphor describing the abstract theory of owner-
ship is that of the bundle of rights.141 Proponents apply the bundle 
theory to all property rights, with no distinction for tangibility or 
movability. In essence, the ''bundle of rights" divides ownership into 
its component pieces, with implicitly varying importance, and with 
only an unstated degree of severability. These component pieces are 
denominated "incidents," but their extent and definition remains sub-
ject to interpretation. That ability to be interpreted serves the thesis 
herein well. The extent and definition of the "incidents" are subject 
to the machinations of society. 
Substantively the metaphor has troubled critics,l42 and semantically 
the concept is lacking in that there are not only rightsl43 incident to 
ownership, but responsibilities.l44 Blackstone's enumeration of the 
right of property can be used to identify the incidents, which include 
"free use, enjoyment and disposal" as well as "control or diminution 
by the laws of the land."l46 The ''bundle'' contains more than just 
rights;l46 even by Blackstone's interpretation, it is more appropriately 
referred to as a ''bundle of sticks."147 
Yet Blackstone and his liberal counterparts viewed property as 
things. This provided a theoretical underpinning for the abolition of 
feudalism. l48 According to Thomas C. Grey, in his essay "The Disinte-
140 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 27 (1962). 
141 Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1055--63 (1989). 
142 See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 280 (1994). "Useful as it is, the bundle 
has several problems .... [I]t suggests that the component entitlements in the bundle are more 
or less alike ... [and] the bundle also metaphorically suggests the sticks' separability." [d. 
143 Examples of this concept are delineated as (1) the right to exclude; (2) the right to 
appropriate the stream of rents; and (3) the right to sell or transfer. See generally GARY D. 
LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989). 
144 See generally Honore, supra note 12. 
145 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 138. 
145 "By the term Property Right (ius reali) should be understood not only a right to a thing 
(ius in re) but also the sum of all the principles having to do with things being mine or yours." 
KANT, supra note 7, at 82 (emphasis added). 
147 See Cohen, supra note 10, at 21. "To be really effective, therefore the right of property 
must be supported by restrictions or positive duties on the part of owners, enforced by the state 
as much as the right to exclude others which is the essence of property." [d. 
148 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS 69, 74 (1980). 
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gration of Property," there were three reasons that simple ownership, 
the ownership of things, dominated liberal thought: (1) ''this concep-
tion mirrored economic reality"-the items of property during this 
time period were really things, not intangibles; (2) ideologically, liber-
alism was an attack on feudalism, "[t]o the rising bourgeoisie, prop-
erty conceived as a web of relations among persons meant the system 
of lord, vassal, and serf from which they were struggling to free 
themselves;" and (3) the "ownership of things by individuals fitted the 
principal justifications for treating property as a natural right."149 
As we have seen, the concept of property has of late divorced itself 
from the thing, to an abstraction that is built on Hohfeld's fundamen-
tal legal reasoning. 
What, then, of the idea that property rights must be rights in 
things? Perhaps we no longer need a notion of ownership, but 
surely property rights are a distinct category from other legal 
rights, in that they pertain to things. But this suggestion cannot 
withstand analysis either; most property in a modern capitalist 
economy is intangible .... Property rights cannot any longer be 
characterized as "rights of ownership" or as "rights in things" by 
specialists in property. 150 
Grey poses this quandary, which leads him to the conclusion that the 
concept of property is vacuous and has in effect disintegrated. 
We have gone, then, in less than two centuries, from a world in 
which property was a central idea mirroring a clearly understood 
institution, to one in which it is no longer a coherent or crucial 
category in our conceptual scheme. The concept of property and 
the institution of property have disintegrated.161 
J.E. Penner goes even further in his criticism of the metaphor: 
The claim I wish to make here is that this "dominant paradigm" 
is really no explanatory model at all, but represents the absence 
of one. "Property is a bundle of rights" is little more than a slogan. 
The use of the word "slogan" is not intended to be merely polemi-
cal. By "slogan" I mean an expression that conjures up an image, 
149 [d. Grey adds that "Jefferson contrasted the free allodial system of land titles in America 
with the servile English system of feudal tenure." [d. 
160 [d. at 70-71 (emphasis added). Grey "contends that the 'disintegration' of property ulti-
mately means that property ceases to be an important category in legal and political theory." 
MUNZER, 8Upra note 1, at 31. In disproving Grey's claim that "[b]ecause of disintegration, 
property today is not identical with the ownership of material things" Munzer states, "[m]ore-
over, thinking of property as the ownership of material things is central to property even today. 
Land and houses are premier examples." [d. at 34. 
161 Grey, supra note 148, at 74. 
1998] ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
but which does not represent a clear thesis or set of proposi-
tions. l62 
373 
Despite its critics, the bundle of sticks metaphor is so prevalent that 
its history and justification are often overlooked.l63 The bundle of 
sticks is the result of the abstraction of property. It moved the defini-
tion of property from the things with which it had once connected. 
The development of the abstraction of property roughly parallels the 
development of the theory of regulatory takings.l54 This is no accident; 
regulatory takings need an abstract basis to be justifiable. 
163 Penner, supra note 117, at 714. 
163 "While it is possible to cite similar accounts, a few citations cannot prove the important 
point-that my presentation does in fact conform to the conventional thinking on the subject." 
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 201 (1977). 
164 In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1871), compensation was necessary to 
landowner for physical taking of property by invasion of water, earth, and sand due to construc-
tion of a state-authorized dam. This case established the ''physical occupation" rule. See ill. at 
178. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 667 (1887), the Court stated that persons are limited in 
their "rights" of ownership of real property. In Mugler, a brewery owner was not compensated 
based on a state law prohibiting him from manufacturing or selling alcohol. [d. The Court found 
that Mugler suffered no invasion of his land. [d. at 669. The case introduced the ''harmful'' or 
''noxious use" concept. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915), a city ordinance 
restricting brick-making within certain areas in a city was found not to be a taking. In Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922), a statute making it unlawful for coal 
companies to cause the collapse or subsidence of property was found to constitute a taking. This 
case was the first time that a regulation was struck down. This case is also known for what it 
did not answer: how far was too far in terms of economic diminution and how is nuisance 
reconciled with economic diminution. In Miller v. SCMene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928), the Court 
ruled that red cedar trees on private property could be destroyed to prevent transmission of 
plant disease. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978), 
considered New York City's landmark statute, in a case involving a proposed office tower to be 
located atop New York's Grand Central Station. The court applied a three-prong test: (1) was 
there a physical invasion, see ill.;(2) is the restriction reasonably related to the policy, see ill. at 
136; and (3) has the owner been denied the possibility of earning a reasonable return, see ill. at 
137. The court ruled there was no taking. See ill. at 138. In First EngliBh Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987), the Court ruled that the remedy 
for over-regulation can include an injunction and damage awards. Temporary takings must also 
be compensated. See ill. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictiB, 480 U.S. 470, 
473-74 (1987), the Court upheld a statute almost identical to the one considered in the Penn-
sylvania Coal case, and held that protection of the surface land was a valid public purpose. In 
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987), a condition appended to a 
building permit required the N ollans to provide an easement for beach access. The Court ruled 
that the "condition substituted for the prohibition" failed to further the end which the state of 
California advanced as the justification for the prohibition. See ill. at 837. The court wrote that 
''unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, 
the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extor-
tion.'" [d. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992), the Court 
held that "[ w ]here the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically 
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into 
the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his 
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The metaphor itself is also somewhat mixed-up. As derived from 
Aesop, the moral of the fable is "strength in unity," in that it repre-
sents metaphorically the strength in unity afforded by the coming 
together of sticks to constitute a bundle. Therefore, in building up the 
bundle with various rights there is the appearance of a whole greater 
than the sum of the parts; nevertheless, in the meaning of property 
there is recognition of the importance of even small vestiges of rights 
which existed in spite of the division of the bundle. The notion of the 
bundle as a metaphor based on Aesop's fable should accordingly be 
discarded. 
The bundle concept is valuable for its notion of divisibility and 
accumulation of diverse and varying "sticks" that can amount to own-
ership. There seems to be no fixed formulation for when these inci-
dents rise to the level that some people term ownership. This is 
perhaps the strong point of the metaphor, rather than a weakness, in 
that it makes such an inquiry fact-sensitive, and thus subject to the 
changes society has mandated. This point has been a source of confu-
sion for courts that have tried to use the bundle as a basis for reason-
ing in various property cases. 
What then is the meaning of property? The weight of the sources 
seems to lie on the side of the abstract bundle of rights theory, which 
holds that all property is rights, and things are irrelevant. This im-
pacts the thesis herein in two ways: (1) green wood is an effort to 
remove some of the abstraction from the theory, at least as it regards 
real property; and (2) within the bundle, the thing is relevant to the 
green wood stick. This is undoubtedly a subtle distinction, but is not 
wholly one of semantics. The first impact has to do with the meaning 
of property; the second refers merely to its incidents. By making this 
distinction, there is no need to alter the meaning of property, but 
rather to add to that bundle of sticks for real property a stick that 
can be identified with the thing.l66 Working within the definition re-
title to begin with." It is this "nature of the owner's estate" to which Justice Scalia refers in the 
Lucas case that is arguably subject to the amount of environmental ethic which society has 
infused into real property law. In Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994), the Court 
considered the appending of a requirement for the building of a bike path and greenway as a 
condition for a development permit along the floodplain of an adjacent creek. The Court held 
that an "essential nexus" between legitimate state interest and the permit condition is neces-
sary, and the government must demonstrate the existence of "rough proportionality" between 
the harm and the burden on the plaintiff. [d. at 386, 397-98. 
166 Courts have misconstrued the bundle to be a fixed set of rights, resistant to any alteration. 
An attempt to quantify the bundle is lampooned in the case of Evans v. Hogue, 296 Or. 745 
(1984). 
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quires an understanding of the individual incidents of property, the 
very rights and duties themselves. 
B. The Incidents of Property 
Property has its duties as well as its rights. 
-Benjamin Disraeli (1845)156 
A recent iteration of the incidents identifies as many as thirteen157 
(adding two to a list of eleven noted by A.M. Honore).158 
1. The right to possess; 
2. The right to use; 
3. The right to manage; 
4. The right to the income; 
5. The right to consume or destroy; 
6. The right to modify; 
7. The right to alienate; 
8. The right to transmit; 
9. The right to security; 
10. The absence of term; 
11. The prohibition of harmful use; 
12. Liability to execution; 
13. Residuary rules.159 
We pause here to point out that the dissent by Justice Campbell arbitrarily has 
determined that a bundle of sticks is made up of ten. It also contends, without author-
ity, that when Sampsons conveyed to Luckeys, Sampsons retained 9.5 of those sticks, 
a figure representing Sampsons' "whole title less the oral rights of possession," and 
Luckeys, even with rights of possession, gained only 0.5 of the sticks. We have found 
authority, albeit somewhat out of date and admittedly unshepardized, for a different 
division of sticks. That authority states: "Possession is eleven points of the law and 
they say there are but twelve." Ray, Proverbs (1678), quoted in McNamara, 2,000 
Famous Legal Quotations 451 (1967). The dissent by Justice Campbell is wrong. 
Clearly, there are twelve sticks in a bundle; Luckeys had eleven and Sampsons had 
one. 
[d. at 756 n.6. 
156 See JOHN BARTLE'IT, BARTLEITS FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 434 (1968) (attributing quota-
tion to Benjamin Disraeli and to Thomas Drummond). 
157 See Becker, supra note 18, at 190-91. 
158 The list expands one of Honore's incidents, the "right to capital," into three: (5) the right 
to consume or destroy; (6) the right to modify; and (7) the right to alienate. See id. at 191 n.10. 
159 See id. at 190-91. The thesis of the author emphasizes both the growth of the "prohibition 
of harmful use" based on the science of ecology and the increased understanding of the results 
of actions on the land, and the addition of a stick, which the author has coined the "duty of 
environmental context." That duty is defined as one which mandates that the basic environ-
mental context of land be preserved in accordance with environmental ethics. 
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The list is more an attempt at explanation than at codification of 
the incidents of property, and is clearly subject to substantial inter-
pretation. One underlying issue, which is touched upon by Honore, is 
whether all the incidents are essential in comprising the fullest pos-
sible estate. If such is the case, then what of limitation placed on a 
particular incident? Honore first states that they are not essential: 
"But the listed incidents are not individually necessary, though they 
may be together sufficient, conditions for the person of inherence to 
be designated 'owner' of a particular thing in a given system."160 But, 
Honore then retracts ever so slightly from that position by stating 
"[t]he interest of which the standard incidents have been depicted is 
usually described as the greatest interest in a thing recognized by the 
law and is contrasted with lesser interests .... "I61 This breeds innate 
confusion between the incidents of the full owner and those with 
lesser interests, to which Honore offers no solution. 
The right to (1) possess, or the right to exclusive physical control, 
includes the highly touted right to exclude, which has been noted as 
the most important right in the entire bundle.162 In Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV, the Supreme Court wrote that "[p]rop-
erty rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights 'to 
possess, use and dispose of it."'I63 The Loretto case held that the 
physical invasion of property by the passage of a cable television wire 
entitled the owner to compensation.l64 
The right to (2) use, the right to (3) manage, and the right to (4) 
income are similar in that they describe the enjoyment of the prop-
erty. The owner's right to use is mentioned in the case of Babbitt v. 
Youpee. l66 The right to manage, a part of the right to use, is the 
160 Honore, supra note 12, at 112. 
161 [d. at 124 (emphasis in original). 
162 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). 
163 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (quoting United 
States v. General Motors Corp., 444 U.S. 51, 65~6 (1979». 
164 In framing the issues in the case, the Court stated: 
This case presents the question whether a minor but permanent physical occupation 
of an owner's property authorized by government constitutes a "taking" of property 
for which just compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the Constitution. New York law provides that a landlord must permit a cable television 
company to install its cable facilities upon his property. In this case, the cable installa-
tion occupied portions of appellant's roof and the side of her building. The New York 
Court of Appeals ruled that this appropriation does not amount to a taking. Because 
we conclude that such a physical occupation of property is a taking, we reverse. 
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421 (citations omitted). 
165 "The United States also contends that amended § 207 satisfies the Constitution's demand 
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incident that allows the owner the power to make decisions about the 
property.166 The right to income consists of the benefits derived from 
the property.167 In Commissioner v. Estate of Church, the Supreme 
Court noted the importance of the right to income, "the grantor's 
reservation of the trust income for his life-[was] one of the chief 
bundle-of-ownership interests .... "166 
The right to capital, which Honore mentions, contains the rights to 
(5) consume or destroy; to (6) modify; and to (7) alienate. The right to 
consume has been construed as the "right to 'use, enjoy, or occupy."'169 
But it has also been held that the right to use and income can be 
separated from the right to consume.170 The right to destroy would 
seem to encompass complete consumption of the property, and would 
thereby be a logical extension of the right to consume and therefore 
the right to use.17l The right to modify would seem to be a lesser 
included right in the right to use. l72 The right to alienate is the right 
to sell or otherwise dispose of the property. "The right to alienate is 
an important element of ownership."l73 The right to alienate implies 
inter vivos transfer of the property, as opposed to (8) the right to 
transmit, which is associated with testamentary transfers.174 In Irving 
because it does not diminish the owner's right to use or enjoy property during his lifetime, and 
does not affect the right to transfer property at death through non-probate means." Babbit v. 
Youpee, 117 S.Ct. 727, 733 (1997). 
166 See Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Yoke, 204 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1953). 
The crucial question is whether the settlor of the trusts retained so much of "the bundle 
of rights" that make up ownership of property as to justify the District Court in 
concluding that he continued to be the owner of the property ... the right to sell the 
property at any price he might determine, the right to reinvest the proceeds in any 
property he might think desirable, the right to rent the property for terms of any 
duration, and the right to borrow money and secure the loan by mortgage of the 
property; in other words ... the right to manage .... 
[d. at 412-13. 
167 See id. at 413. 
166 Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 641 (1949). See also Fidelity-Philadelphia 
Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 279 (1958). 
166 Phinney v. Kay, 275 F.2d 776, 779 (5th Cir. 1960). 
170 See Bell v. Harrison, 212 F.2d 253, 254 (7th Cir. 1954). 
171 See United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1960). ''That compensation 
would not include the hydroelectric power value, but it would embrace [the Power Company's] 
property right to destroy the value of the lands for agricultural and forestry purposes." [d. at 
634 (alteration in original). 
172 Cases with respect to modification arise when that right is retained, usually with regard 
to a trust. See United States v. Gordon, 406 F.2d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1969); Commissioner v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231,235 (5th Cir. 1958). 
173 United States v. Hawkins County, No. 85-5533,1987 WL 36584, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 8,1997) 
(unpublished disposition). 
174 Becker, supra note 18, at 191. 
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Trust v. Day, the Supreme Court refers to the right to transmit the 
property of a testator, but holds that "[n]othing in the Federal Con-
stitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even 
abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within 
its jurisdiction."176 Honore calls the right to transmit an incident 
rather than a right, since it does not necessarily depend on the 
holder's choice.176 This is also related to (10) the absence of term, which 
implies that the rights will last beyond the owner's death. 
Becker defines the right to (9) security as "immunity from expro-
priation,"l77 but Honore notes that "a general right to security, avail-
ing against others, is consistent with the existence of a power to 
expropriate or divest in the state or public authorities."178 Honore 
continues to claim that a general right to expropriate is inconsistent 
with the "institution of ownership" even when compensation is paid.179 
The incident (12) liability to execution is related to the right of secu-
rity, and is a part of property for the purpose of allowing the "growth 
of credit"l80 and the institution of secured transactions to flourish. 
When one examines the incidents that have been instituted for the 
purpose of fostering societal progress, the liability to execution is 
perhaps the most blatant attempt at a severe limitation to property 
rights, calculated to achieve its goal. It is in this context that Honore 
asks the rhetorical question, "[W]hether any other limitations [in 
addition to the liability to execution] on ownership imposed in the 
social interest should be regarded as among its standard incidents."181 
Although Honore fails to answer his own question, I will attempt to 
do so by justifying the green wood incident. 
In a property ownership institution, which is based on either law 
or contract, it is manifest that authority, if democratically based, must 
arise from the consensus of the people, which takes the form of gov-
ernment. 
The government of the Union, then (whatever may be the in-
fluence of this fact on the case), is, emphatically and truly, a 
government of the people. In form, and in substance, it emanates 
175 Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942). 
175 See Honore, supra note 12, at 121. 
177 Becker, 8Upra note 18, at 191. 
178 Honore, 8Upra note 12, at 119. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 123. 
ISIId. 
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from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exer-
cised directly on them, and for their benefit.l82 
In this sense, the government is both the grantor of property rights 
and its guarantor. This arrangement has been subject to reciprocal 
rights and duties, such as taxation, that can be imposed on property. 
Taxation of property can be seen as a forfeiture of the property, and 
as such would be inapposite to Honore's claim that a general power 
to expropriate is an anathema to property institutions. To conclude 
thus, he has created the fictive distinction between condemnation and 
taxation. As has been said, however, ''the power to tax involves the 
power to destroy."183 We have institutionalized property taxes, and to 
ignore this de facto incident of property is more than an oversight-it 
is an intentional effort to systematically exclude societal obligations 
from nominal presence in the bundle. Becker concedes that elements 
such as taxation and condemnation could be limitations on certain 
incidents; he does not go so far as to designate them as such.l84 Honore 
admits that a strong case could be made for the inclusion of either in 
182 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 40lH>6 (1819). 
[d. 
If anyone proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might 
expect it would be this-that the government of the Union, though limited in its 
powers, is supreme within its sphere of action. This would seem to result, necessarily, 
from its nature. It is the government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it repre-
sents all, and acts for all. Though anyone state may be willing to control its operations, 
no state is willing to allow others to control them. The nation, on those subjects on 
which it can act, must necessarily bind its component parts. But this question is not 
left to mere reason: the people have, in express terms, decided it, by saying, "this 
constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof," "shall be the supreme law of the land," and by requiring that the members 
of the state legislatures, and the officers of the executive and judicial departments of 
the states, shall take the oath of fidelity to it. The government of the United States, 
then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance 
of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or 
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 
183 [d. at 431. 
That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may 
defeat and render useless the power to create; that there is a plain repugnance in 
conferring on one government a power to control the constitutional measures of 
another, which other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be supreme 
over that which exerts the control, are propositions not to be denied. But all inconsis-
tencies are to be reconciled by the magic of the word confidence. Taxation, it is said, 
does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy. 'lb carry it to the excess of destruction 
would be an abuse, to presume which, would banish that confidence which is essential 
to all government. 
[d. See also Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997). 
184 See Becker, supra note 18, at 191. 
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the bundle, but balks at their enumeration, making the rather broad 
concession that "perhaps, a characteristic of ownership that the 
owner's claims are ultimately postponed to the claims of the public 
authority, even if only indirectly, in that the thing owned may, within 
defined limits, be taken from the owner in order to pay the expenses 
of running the state or to provide it with essential facilities."l85 
An examination of this statement reveals that Honore does under-
stand the necessity of governmental limitations on property rights, 
and that these limitations may be expressed in terms of the incidents 
of ownership. His reference to "essential facilities" would aptly cover 
the need of society to preserve the environmental context of land. The 
concept of environmental context is alluded to in the case of Just v. 
Marinette County,186 in which the court states that a landowner "has 
no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural char-
acter of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited 
in its natural state and which injures the rights of others."187 The 
environmental context is the essential character of the land referred 
to in Just. 
The basis for his acquiescence to the existence of this incident is 
the understanding that like taxation, governmental limitation of prop-
erty rights is firmly grounded on the need to maintain the very 
authority that grants and guarantees the property rights in the first 
instance. Contrary to this assertion, Professor Richard A. Epstein 
would, with a certain degree of consistency, lump taxation and regu-
lation together as actions by government which trigger compensation. 
"All regulations, all taxes, and all modifications of liability rules are 
takings of private property prima facie compensable by the state.lI188 
In making this argument Epstein first focuses on government "pitted 
against isolated individuals who assert that their property has been 
taken,1I189 and relying on Locke claims that taxation, regulation, and 
modifications of liability "are amenable to the same form of analysis 
as garden variety takings of land; they cannot be kept in a watertight 
compartment separate from takings of private property."l90 
185 Honore, supra note 12, at 124. 
186 Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). 
187 [d. at 768. 
188 RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 95 (1985). 
189 [d. at 93. 
190 [d. 
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Epstein's overwhelming reliance on Locke is both misplaced and 
erroneous. It is misplaced in that it assumes the dominance of the 
Lockean theories of property throughout American history. "During 
most of the nineteenth century, individualism was balanced with more 
community-oriented republican and commonwealth thinking; Locke's 
theory of property was dominant only during the Lochner era."191 The 
Lochner era represents what Professor Cass Sunstein notes was an 
era in which "the police power could not be used to help those unable 
to protect themselves in the marketplace."l92 It is erroneous in that 
Locke himself acknowledges otherwise. Even Locke recognizes the 
necessity of taxation as a limitation on property rights. "It is true, 
governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit 
everyone who enjoys his share of the protection should payout of his 
estate his proportion of the maintenance of it."l93 
The inclusion of taxation in this argument seems to be a fatal flaw 
in its logic; all but the anarchist value government to some degree, 
however small, and recognize the necessity to pay for its services, 
however few. That taxation is a taking inures to the fact that the 
government must be compensated at some point for its "givings." 
Moreover, the actions taken by government, whether taxation, regu-
lation, or changes to common law liability rules, can be seen alterna-
tively as the government acting as the amalgam of other private 
citizens, private property owners whose property rights the govern-
ment is championing. This can be seen from Epstein's example of the 
filling of a wetland. "That wetlands are preserved only identifies a 
possible gain to the public; it does not eliminate the constitutional 
obligation."l94 This observation demonstrates a fundamental misstate-
ment of ecological reality as well as a slanted view of property. Filling 
a wetland affects the private property rights of every single land-
owner whose land, in proximity to that wetland, ultimately will be 
affected. The fact that the government is acting on behalf of those 
landowners, through the lawful mandates of their representative gov-
ernment, does not invoke a constitutional question. The potential 
191 Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for 
Intellectual and Legal History in Thkings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1159 (1996) (citing 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905». 
192 Sunstein, supra note 78, at 880. Sunstein notes, however, that this is an oversimplification. 
See id. 
193 5 JOHN LOCKE, WORKS 421 (1823) (Aalen, Ger.: Scientia Verlag, 1963) [hereinafter 5 LOCKE, 
WORKS]. 
194 EpSTEIN, supra note 188, at 123. 
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wetland filler is the one who is contemplating a taking, not those 
affected thereby. 
The (11) prohibition against harmful use is primarily based on nui-
sance principles that prohibit the use of one's property in harming 
another. The Supreme Court's heavy emphasis on the law of nuisance 
in the case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, as a justifica-
tion for a taking even when all value is eliminated from the subject 
property, gives credence to the importance of this incident.195 Impor-
tant among these thirteen incidents, for purposes of this discussion, 
the prohibition against harmful use would seem to prevent action on 
one's property that would harm the ecosystem.l96 The affirmative 
imposition of this duty can be used as a basis for the prohibition of 
activities that would otherwise have been legal. Because lawful uses 
could produce harmful results, the prohibition allows for the limitation 
of those uses. l97 These conceivably could include the development of 
wetlands, and other uses which are based on ecological principles. 
This duty imposed upon the owners would also seem on its face to 
directly contradict the aforementioned right to consume or destroy. 
This dichotomy can be explained by the divergent focus of the conflict-
ing incidents. Harmful use connotes harm of others off the property; 
the right to consume or destroy is limited to the bounds of the prop-
erty and represents the owners' right to diminish the value of their 
property, but without external effects. Can the right to consume or 
destroy be reconciled with the principles of ecology, which emphasize 
the relationship between the uses of one property and the effects on 
another? Although many scenarios can be constructed which afford 
the owner the ability to "consume or destroy" without external ef-
fects, the increased understanding of ecology must act to minimize 
the right to prevent the harmful effects of that consumption or de-
struction. The laws of subjacent and lateral support as well as nui-
195 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992). 
196 According to Penner, "[r]ather than being an incident of property, the 'prohibition of 
harmful use' merely indicates the existence of basic prohibitions against acting maliciously or 
carelessly to harm others." Penner, supra note 117, at 761. If this were the case, no mention of 
the prohibition would be necessary, as such act would be covered wholly by nuisance. 
197 See, e.g., In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736, 746 (Me. 1973). 
Id. 
It seems self-evident in these times of increased awareness of the relationship of the 
environment to human health and welfare that the state may act-if it acts properly-
to conserve the quality of air, soil and water. 
Th do so the State may justifiably limit the use that some owners may make of their 
property. Our law has long recognized that a landowner holds his property subject to 
the limitation that he may not use it to the serious disadvantage of the public. 
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sance laws act to protect the interest of those who would exercise the 
right to destroy in derogation of their duty to avoid harmful use.l98 
C. Ownership and the Incidents 
There is no magic in the term "owner," because that concept ebbs 
and flows depending on the incidents owned and the degree of domin-
ion available in a particular society. The owner under Roman law 
would merely hold a usufruct interest, perhaps greater than other 
citizens, but wholly subject to the sovereign. Ownership of soil in the 
provinces of the Roman Empire was "occupied by the title of usu-
fruct."l99 While literally the "right of enjoying a thing,'12°O the nature 
of usus fructus in Greek and Roman law is limited to the right to use, 
without the full ownership implied by dominium. "Usufruct is the 
right of using and taking the produce of another's property, without 
altering the substance, for it is a right over the substance, and, if this 
perish, the usufruct itself necessarily disappear also."201 A literal anal-
ogy might be drawn from a fruit tree, the fruits of which a usufruct 
is entitled to, but not the incidents of the tree itself. 
A feudal interest might appear as ownership, with regard to the 
rest of the world, yet that interest would be subject to the duties and 
services that were appurtenant to the interest and due to the lord. 
Currently an owner might be subject to a mortgagee's interest, or the 
right of possession of a tenant. The term "owner" is therefore some-
what amorphous, and should be considered a relative measure of one's 
interest in property rather than an absolute. 
The malleability of the incidents of property is a testament to the 
fact that ownership is a matter of degree. In his essay The Moral 
Basis of Property Rights, Lawrence Becker differentiates between 
the full-ownership concept with which Honore begins his analysis and 
the term "property rights."202 This is a key distinction, which tends to 
dilute the importance of the bundle and focus on the sticks. N ever-
198 With regard to the interplay between rights and duties, see generally Wesley N. Hohfeld, 
Some FuruiALmental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.T. 16 
(1913). See also JOHN STUART MILL, COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 199 (John M. 
Robson ed., 1984). 
199 DE LAVELEYE, supra note 15, at 338. 
200 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1384 (Joseph E. Nolon & M.J. 
Connolly eds., 5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter BLACK'S 1979]. 
201 JUST. II § 1 in 3 GAIUS, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN (T. Lambert Mears 
trans., 1882); see also JUST. II §§ 2-4, in 4 GAIUS, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINAN 
(T. Lambert Mears trans., 1882). 
202 Becker, supra note 18, at 192. 
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theless, the current conception of property in the United States is 
consistent with Becker's view of the importance of the incidents and 
the minimal import of the bundle. According to Bruce A. Ackerman, 
"[f]or the legal Scientist, the cardinal sin is to discriminate among 
property bundles and declare that some contain the essential rights 
of property while others do not. . . . While the Scientist recognizes 
that some bundles contain more rights than others, all are equally 
property bundles.''203 
Case law bears out this conclusion. In Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, the Court points to a particular stick, noting that petitioner 
still can enjoy other attributes of ownership, such as the right to 
exclude others, "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property.''204 In Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, the Court determined that 
the "support estate" was "merely a part of the entire bundle of rights 
possessed by the owner.''206 In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the court found 
that the right to exclude others is "one of the most essential sticks in 
the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."206 
Becker expounds upon this by identifying the rights in the bundle 
and noting that they are the property rights that can stand alone.207 
This creates a dichotomy between rights and duties, rendering the 
bundle itself meaningless. One can strip away some of the rights from 
the bundle, and one could strip away some of the duties, but with each 
right a correlative duty must remain. The nature of the bundle is that 
it contains the Hohfeldian incidents that Honore and Becker have 
described.208 The only way to maintain the importance of the bundle 
is to emphasize the relativity of the rights and duties. 
In identifying a correlative duty to the rights to use,209 manage, and 
modify, the idea of a duty of maintaining the environmental context 
201! Ackerman, supra note 153, at 116. 
204 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
206 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 501 (1987). 
206 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994). 
207 Becker, supra note 18, at 192. 
208 The incidents that Honore and Becker have described reflect their enumeration of the 
rights and some of the correlative duties that Hohfeld's analysis could identify. It is arguable 
that for each right a correlative duty could be enumerated. 
209 "[T]here are no laws merely creating rights. There are laws, it is true, which merely create 
duties .... But every law, really conferring a right, imposes expressly or tacitly a relative duty, 
or a duty correlating with the right." JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 
DETERMINED, 3lh'J4 (Wilfred E. Rumble ed., 1995) (emphasis added) [hereinafter AUSTIN, 
PROVINCE]. 
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might be appropriate, provided that the societal interest of such a 
duty is demonstrated.210 Such a duty would require the assessment of 
the environmental impacts of the assertion of such rights, and have a 
substantive requirement to maintain the context that was determined 
to be appropriate under the fact-heavy circumstances. This stick of 
environmental context would be the one stick that would be firmly 
rooted in the property to which it was appended. In that sense, it 
would be closely tied to the thing, the actual plot of land, or the res.211 
The bundle of sticks that has become emblematic of ownership has 
become theoretical to a fault, and that fault is the exclusion of the res, 
the thing, from analysis.212 Because the very essence of real property 
is unique, and is governed by rules of nature that transcend the 
incidents of ownership, the failure of the bundle to be tied to the 
ground makes the unique nature of a parcel of land irrelevant to its 
disposition. This disconnection with reality has resulted in such mis-
guided decisions as Lucas,213 that view land as fungible and inter-
changeable because the bundle of rights are transcendent.214 
210 This will be attempted infra, in the sections on Environmental Ethics, Ecology, and Green 
Wood. 
211 Honore, BUpra note 12, at 128--34. Honore doesn't relegate the discussion of "things" to 
blasphemy, as do some of his colleagues, as he writes: 
[T]he force of the proposal is a protest against the habit of thinking of the ownership 
of a thing, particularly a material object, as if it consisted only in a relation between a 
person and a thing, and not at all in relations between the owner and other persons. 
Yet to speak always of owning rights rather than things would be doubly misleading. 
Ownership, as we have seen, is not just a bundle of rights, as it is no help towards 
understanding our society to speak as if it were. Secondly, the idiom which directly 
couples the owner with the thing owned is far from pointless; where the right to 
exclude others exists, there is indeed (legally) a very special relation between the 
holder of the right and the thing, and this is a rational way of marking it. 
[d. at 134 (footnote omitted). 
212 But Bee Penner, supra note 117, at 733. "No one has ever produced a general description 
of the incidents of property which transcend a reliance, either explicitly or implicitly, on an 
underlying relation between the property owner and the 'thing' he owns." [d. 
213 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
214 See id. at 1029--31. The absence of these considerations in the context of a ''takings'' case 
is dramatized by the following description of the land considered by the Lucas Court: 
The land at issue in liucaB is virtually a mirage. The property is immediately adjacent 
to the shore, with no natural barrier to separate the proposed construction sites from 
the ocean. Subject to the daily action of the tide and erosion from storms, the shifting 
sands of Lucas' beach are no more static than the waters that constantly transform 
them. Both of Lucas' lots were entirely under water as recently as 1963, and partially 
covered by ocean ponds as late as 1973. Further, due to competing forces of accretion 
and erosion, the shoreline has been forward of Lucas' seaward property line 50 percent 
of the time since 1949, and landward of the road behind Lucas' lots 15 to 20 percent of 
the time over that same period. 
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The idea of property-or, if you prefer, the sophisticated or legal 
conception of property-involves a constellation of Hohfeldian 
elements, correlatives, and opposites; a specification of standard 
incidents of ownership and other related but less powerful inter-
ests; and a catalog of ''things'' (tangible and intangible) that are 
subjects of these incidents.216 
The uniqueness of real property is justifiable, as was the uniqueness 
of persons who were held as slaves: property. Without consideration 
of the res there is no distinction between the slave and the rest of the 
farm implements. In the case of slavery there was a moral, as well as 
a legal, obligation to look to the res, and distinguish it (them) from 
mere property. While the need for a moral basis to justify the consid-
eration of real property as a "thing" is less compelling than that with 
regard to human slavery, the moral basis is afforded by the environ-
mental ethic. The physical distinction is afforded by the under-
standing of both the interconnected nature of land and its identifica-
tion as a living ecosystem.216 If you consider the land as the res, the 
title only includes those incidents that are (1) physically feasible, and 
(2) societally permissible. Those incidents that are physically feasible 
are bounded and governed by the science of ecology. Those incidents 
that are societally permissible are restricted by the environmental 
ethics which that society has either implicitly or explicitly adopted. 
This interpretation is facilitated by the fact that the land has certain 
characteristics that are unique and intractable. 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
Recognition of the importance of the natural environment and its 
value, both innate and economic, is a trend that has blossomed since 
the early 1960s.217 This recognition is perhaps partially the legacy of 
Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the CmTect "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1422 (1993) 
(citations omitted). 
215 MUNZER, supra note 1, at 23 (emphasis added). 
216 Unlike the abolition of slavery, which is recognition of the humanity and the rights of 
human beings, no claim is made herein for a recognition of the rights of nature. For such a claim 
see generally RODERICK NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE (1989) [hereinafter NASH, NATURE]; 
CHRISTOPHER STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?-TowARDS LEGAL RIGHTS FOR 
NATURAL OBJECTS (1974). 
217 This date is chosen arbitrarily from the year of publication of Rachel Carson's seminal book 
Silent Spring. CARSON, 8UpTa note 76. Professor David Sive, the "Father of Environmental 
Law," links the birth of the contemporary environmental movement to three events: (1) the 
Storm King Mountain case, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal PCfWer Com-
mission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965); (2) the publication of SILENT SPRING; and (3) the Wilderness 
Act of 1964 (16 U.S.C. § 1131). Interview with Professor David R. Sive (May 6,1997). 
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(1) a rich literary heritage218 underscored by such prescient thinkers 
as Henry David Thoreau, Aldo Leopold, and Rachel Carson;219 (2) the 
growth of the science of the natural environment-ecology;220 and (3) 
the horrifying legacy of two centuries of mindless exploitation of the 
natural environment.221 To a large extent, this recognition was the im-
petus for environmental laws and regulation, which have been punc-
tuated over the past thirty-five years by both tremendous successes222 
and abject failures.223 Behind these efforts is a developing body of 
moral principles that consider the natural environment and the role 
of humans within it. This body of moral principles is denominated 
"environmental ethics." 
The concept of environmental ethics is evolving and has been mold-
ed by cultural, social, and scientific factors. The science of ecology has 
been the most significant factor in the development of environmental 
ethics over the course of the last century. "In scientific terms, ecolo-
gists explained the rather evident fact that humans are dependent on 
other species for energy and nutrition."224 This work is not intended 
as an effort to come up with a new definition of environmental ethics, 
but rather to identify the core values comprising environmental eth-
ics, to demonstrate how those values have become ingrained into the 
fabric of our society, and thereby to illustrate how they can be infused 
into real property laws.225 Because values do become part of the com-
mon law it is necessary to elaborate those values. 
218 See NASH, WILDERNESS, supra note 30, at 44-66 ("Appreciation of wilderness began in the 
cities. The literary gentlemen wielding a pen, not the pioneer with his axe, made the first 
gestures of resistance against the strong currents of antipathy."). 
219 See generally PAUL BROOKS, SPEAKING FOR NATURE (1980). 
220 See Don E. Marietta, Jr., The Interrelationship of Ecological Science and Environmental 
Ethics, 1 ENVTL. ETHICS 195, 197 (1979) ("The basic concept behind an ecological ethic is that 
morally acceptable treatment of the environment is that which does not upset the integrity of 
the ecosystem as it is seen in a diversity of life forms existing in a dynamic and complex but 
stable interdependency."). 
221 But see generally GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH (1995); RONALD 
BAILEY, THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET (1995); RONALD BAILEY, ECO-SCAM: THE FALSE 
PROPHETS OF ECOLOGICAL APOCALYPSE (1993); BEN BLOCH & HAROLD LYNCH, APOCALYPSE 
NOT (1993). 
222 See, e.g., Averting a Death Foretold, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 28, 1994, at 72 (author unattributed). 
223 See generally Donald Stever, Experience and Lessons of Twenty-Five Years of Environ-
mental Law: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Headed, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1105 (1994). 
224 ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, JUSTICE AND THE EARTH: IMAGES FOR OUR PLANETARY SURVIVAL 
10--11 (1993). 
225 See generally J. Baird Callicott, Elements of the Environmental Ethic: Moral Consider-
ability and the Biotic Community, 1 ENVTL. ETHICS 71 (1979). 
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Defining environmental ethics226 is difficult because it is a value, and 
is therefore implicitly subjective.227 It is only when the environmental 
ethic is taken from the science of ecology that a more objective defini-
tion can be fashioned. The heritage of the American Indian is an 
important precursor to a land ethic. "The people needed the land and 
each other too much to permit wanton accumulation and ecological 
impairment to the living source of nourishment."228 The American 
Indian on the North American continent was a vestige of the subsis-
tence cultures from which the settlers had long since emerged. Their 
experience in the practical application of the land ethic has largely 
been ignored.229 
History demonstrates a lack of regard for nature, some of which is 
attributable to the failure of "civilized" cultures to understand the 
patterns and processes of nature. Perhaps paradoxically, that under-
standing was fostered both by the "primitive" practice of subsistence 
cultures and the "modern" study of ecology. Religious beliefs have 
often affected the degree of stewardship that humans extended over 
their natural surroundings. Some American Indian beliefs230 in deities 
associated with the earth fostered the fledgling environmental ethic 
of the American Indians. Examples include the Sioux concept of the 
"Great Spirit and of the Earth Mother and the family-like relatedness 
of all creatures .... "231 "American Indian cultures provided their 
members with an environmental ethical ideal."232 
For some, beliefs in an omnipotent deity that exercises power over 
nature have limited the human responsibility for nature. These beliefs 
226 The term "environmental ethics" is used interchangeably with the term "land ethics." 
227 See generally Holmes Rolston III, Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?, 4 ENVTL. 
ETHICS 125 (1982). 
226 FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPO-
RARY TRIBAL LIFE 14 (1995). 
229 See generally LUTHER STANDING BEAR, THE LAND OF THE SPO'ITED EAGLE (1933); JOHN 
NIEHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS (1932). 
230 Obviously one cannot (and should not) generalize about the beliefs (actions, etc.) of any 
group. 
231 J. Baird Callicott, Traditional American Indian and Western European Attitudes Toward 
Nature: An Overview, 4 ENVTL. ETHICS 293, 302 (1982). Callicott characterizes this as "nearly 
a universal American Indian idea." Id. at 303. 
232 Id. (emphasis supplied). Callicott notes that there is a question regarding the motivation 
for American Indians which manifested itself in this ideal. In doing so he clearly lays out the 
issue of motivation in terms of competing philosophical camps. 
Following [David] Hume [(1711-1776)], I am willing to label behavior toward nature 
"ethical" or "moral" which is motivated by esteem, respect, regard, kinship, affection, 
and sympathy; Kant, on the other hand, regarded all behavior motivated by "mere 
inclination" (i.e., sentiment or feeling), however unselfish, as lacking genuine moral 
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may have obscured the role of humans in stewardship and fostered 
complacency about the human environment. The advent of evolution-
ary theory, and importantly, the fitting of that theory within the 
context of widespread religious beliefs, allowing for its acceptance by 
religions and its juxtaposition with religion, has promoted the recog-
nition of human intervention and human stewardship as the primary 
tools to maintain the environment. 
Key to the movement toward an environmental ethic have been the 
writings (and deeds) of prescient thinkers, such as George Perkins 
Marsh (1801-1882),233 Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882),234 John Bur-
roughs (1837-1921),235 and John Muir (1838-1914),236 who adopted en-
vironmentally ethical views long before it fit within the popular meta-
phor following the widespread acceptance of Darwinism. The 
ecological wisdom that characterizes the writings of Henry David 
Thoreau (1817-1862) now stands as a beacon, although he and like-
minded thinkers were largely ignored, if not scoffed at, by a world 
bent on industrial progress. Nonetheless, environmental ethics could 
not exist in the absence of a basic understanding of ecology, and 
ecology could not exist as a science without the acceptance of an 
evolutionary theory.237 In the case of Thoreau, it can be persuasively 
argued that he understood and accepted the evolutionary theories 
necessary to develop his understanding of ecology. This prescience, 
however, was extremely rare in the early nineteenth century, and 
therefore was absent in the early evolution of common law, as well as 
in the institution of constitutional law in the late eighteenth century 
in the newly formed United States of America. 
One can only speculate what provisions would have been included 
in a U.S. Constitution drafted with principles of environmental ethics 
in mind. There are, however, clear indications of the role that regula-
tions of real property played in the colonial period. During that period, 
property ownership concepts contained certain positive societal re-
worth. For Kant, to be counted as ethical an action must be inspired solely by unsen-
timental duty toward some abstract precept, some categorical imperative, issued by 
pure reason unsullied by any empirical content. 
[d. I openly embrace the Humean view with regard to the construction of an environmental 
ethic. 
233 See generally GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (1864). 
234 See generally RALPH WALDO EMERSON, N ATURE/RALPH WALDO EMERSON: A FACSIMILE 
OF THE FIRST EDITION (1985). 
235 See generally JOHN BURROUGHS, WAYS OF NATURE (1905). 
236 See generally JOHN MUIR, THE YOSEMITE (1912). 
237 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 225, at xvi. 
390 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:347 
sponsibilities, rather than an absolute right to do anything the owner 
wished to the property.238 "[P]eople could not use their property in a 
manner that was inconsistent with the community's ethical standards, 
or its economic needs.''239 The nature of that stewardship was molded 
to reach societal goals,240 and to afford the community protection from 
external harm. There were town herds of cattle, and regulations 
requiring the maintenance of fences about fields and meadows.241 
Much of the modern study of environmental ethics is based on the 
writings of Aldo Leopold (1886-1948),242 particularly on his essay "The 
Land Ethic."243 His ethic has been drawn from his bold statement that 
"[a] thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, 
and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends other-
wise."244 While simplistic in its message, this single statement has 
been the subject of dozens if not hundreds of scholarly articles,245 and 
is itself perhaps the raison d'etre for the scholarly journal Environ-
mental Ethics.246 
Leopold's reference to the "integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community"247 is clearly a reference to "an ecosystem, and its 
capacity to withstand change or stress."248 Environmental ethics is 
238 See id. at 1281. 
239 Nelson, supra note 37, at 52. 
240 Prior to 1776: 
[d. 
[c]ommunities intruded on the property of individuals in many ways .... One who had 
title to the land on which a road was built would, of course, receive damages for his 
resulting costs and inconveniences .... The building of a road, however, was the only 
restriction on the use of private property that resulted in compensation in the form of 
damages. Many other restrictions imposed on land for the public benefit were uncom-
pensated. 
241 See HERBERT L. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
433, 456 (1904). 
242 See generally CURT MEINE, ALDO LEOPOLD: HIS LIFE AND WORK (1988). 
243 See LEOPOLD, supra note 32, at 237-64. 
244 [d. at 262. 
245 See generally Robert J. Goldstein, Research Guide: A Bibliographic Reference for Focused 
Legal Research on Real Property Ownership, Ecology and Environmental Ethics (on file with 
author). 
246 While this is clearly not the stated purpose, the writings of Leopold are referenced in 
nearly every issue of the journal. 
247 It is important to note that Leopold is referenced here for his influence on environmental 
ethics, not ecology. While he and his contemporaries referenced such notions as "stability" or 
the image of a climax stage in an ecosystem's growth, these concepts largely have been aban-
doned. 
248James D. Heffernan, TIw Land Ethic: A Critical Appraisal, 4 ENVTL. ETHICS 235, 237 
(1982). 
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based on the understanding of the science of ecology, which identifies 
and quantifies the patterns and processes that operate in that system 
we call nature. Understanding of those processes as the means by 
which nature both maintains and regulates the existence of life on 
earth implies that maintenance of those patterns and processes should 
be seen as a basic ethic appurtenant to the maintenance of human life. 
Modern paradigms of ecology place emphasis on the flux of nature, 
rather than any notion of a steady state or climax, as in the case of a 
forest. Rachel Carson (1907-1964) was also instrumental in congealing 
the attitudes of society to focus on the destruction of ecosystems by 
pesticides, and thereby moved the activist popUlation of the 1960s 
toward environmentalism.249 The works of Carson, Leopold, and 
Thoreau, and many others, did more than simply expose a threat to 
the environment-they provided the impetus for popular movements 
that have evolved into the modern environmental movement. 
What is an environmental ethic? It is an understanding that in 
an ecosystem every action taken has consequences; those conse-
quences may be adjudged as positive or negative values based on the 
needs of society; and that persons must act as stewards of their 
domain, whether that domain be their "owned" real property or some 
lesser interest, to prevent actions that cause negative consequences. 
The extent to which this (or any) environmental ethic has become 
assimilated into our core values is the key issue to be determined. 
There are limits to environmental ethics based upon sound ecological 
principles. The human animal is a part of the ecosystem, not merely 
an aloof observer.250 The human has the ethical right to be a partici-
pant in its environment, and that participation is limited only by the 
constraints that human society has placed upon itself and the compo-
nent of that restraint which is the environmental ethic. 
A. Environmental Ethics and Stewardship 
Aldo Leopold wrote in his classic essay, "The Land Ethic," "[A] land 
ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-
community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his 
fellow-members, and respect for the community as such."251 From this 
land ethic, and based on Leopold's writings, the concept of steward-
249 See generally John Barker & Robert J. Goldstein, The DDT Paradigm and Electromag-
netic Fields: Policy and Scientific Uncertainty, 17 J. PROD. & TaXICS LIAB. 285 (1995). 
250 See generally Tom Colwell, The Ethics of Being Part of Nature, 9 ENVTL. ETHICS 99 (1987). 
251 LEOPOLD, supra note 32, at 240. 
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ship has been developed. "Obligations have no meaning without con-
science, and the problem we face is the extension of the social con-
science from people to land.'1252 The application of this social conscience 
to land is the essence of the distinction between ownership and stew-
ardship. It is also the understanding that the presence of green wood 
in the bundle of sticks gives us the obligation that must be applied 
with conscience based on our understanding of the importance of land 
beyond that of the inanimate sticks in the bundle. Leopold pointed to 
the moral obligation of stewardship, noting with frustration that the 
"proof that conservation has not yet touched these [ethical] founda-
tions of conduct lies in the fact that philosophy and religion have not 
yet heard of it."253 That yearning of Leopold's has been satisfied by 
the environmental movement, which has effected an "internal change 
in our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions."254 
Because of this precipitous progress, we are ready as a society to take 
the next logical step in a line that began with the earliest concepts of 
property, and that evolves still. The green wood in the bundle of sticks 
makes stewardship a legal responsibility in addition to a moral one. 
B. A Shift in Society255 Toward Environmental Ethics256 
The environmental movement and the history of environmentalism 
highlight the shift in society toward an environmental ethic.257 This is 
an important factor in recognizing the shift in the law. As Cardozo 
wrote, "One of the marks by which we recognize a social interest as 
252 Id. at 246. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
266 The pitfalls of using social materials in legal scholarship are well noted; that is why the 
social materials noted herein are limited to contemporary materials. See Robert W. Gordon, 
Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1019 (1981). 
Any use at all of these social materials, even pure doctrinal scholarship that restricts 
its scope to legal texts will expose the user to historical criticism. The critic will claim 
that the scholar has, in one way or another, seriously distorted reality by failing to take 
adequate account of the social and historical contingency of the materials. 
Id. at 1020. 
256 Reference is made to the "naturalistic fallacy" which philosophers might assert to diffuse 
the following argument. Being a lawyer rather than a trained philosopher, I will leave the 
defense of that dichotomy to those capable of defending it. See generally Holmes Rolston, III, 
Hume's Is/Ought Dichotomy and the Relation of Ecology to Leopold's Land Ethic, 4 ENVTL. 
ETHICS 163 (1982). 
257 See generally PHILIP SHABACOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRON-
MENTAL MOVEMENT (1993). 
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worthy of protection is the spontaneity and persistence with which 
groups are established to conserve it."258 
There can be little question of the growth of attention and concern 
toward environmental issues over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury.259 The issue is whether the social interest in environmental ethics 
is weighty enough to justify a shift in the law of real property. One 
assessment that can be made is to review the political climate.260 This 
could be especially enlightening as a retrospective analysis of the 
104th Congress and its failure to abrogate environmental statutes 
that it had pledged to roll back.261 The effort resulted in the emer-
gence of counter-revolutionaries in the environmental area and on the 
Republican side of the aisle.262 One coalition of moderates, nominally 
led by Rep. Sherwood Boehlert, R-NY,263 thwarted attempts by the 
House leadership to eviscerate environmentallaws.264 Another gauge 
of the political climate was the New York Times op-ed by Sen. John 
258 CARDOZO, supra note 45, at 133. 
259 See, e.g., Randy Lee Loftis, Centers of Attention; Outlook on Environment Debated as 
Nation Marks 26th Earth Day, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 22, 1996, at 15A. 
Id. 
Polls have confirmed repeatedly over the past few years that most people don't believe 
that the environment and the economy must always be at odds. A new Roper survey 
released last week reinforced that finding. The survey's authors also said they found 
many people pursuing a new type of American dream that seems to reflect the envi-
ronmental vision that Mr. Lash [that ''property, environment and fairness are not 
mutually inconsistent goals"] described. 
260 See Walter R. Burkley, Special Project: Environmental Reform in an Era of Political 
Discontent: Introduction, 49 VAND. L. REV. 677, 678 (1996). ''While the existing environmental 
regulatory structure is certainly in need of reform, the reform must proceed from this broad 
consensus in favor of environmental protection." Id. at 688 (footnote omitted). 
261 See generally NEWT GINGRICH & RICHARD K. ARMEY, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE 
BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO 
CHANGE THE NATION (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994). 
262 "But some environmentalists are starting to say, with a hint of wonder in their voices, that 
they are close to success in making environmental programs what one lobbyist called a 'third 
rail,' political slang for issues like Social Security that are best not touched because they carry 
such voltage with voters." John H. Cushman, Jr., G.O.P. Backing Off Tough Stand over Envi-
ronment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1996, at Al. 
263 See Kevin Sack, A Moderate Republican Walks the Tightrope, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995, 
at B5. 
264 See Daniel P. Jones, GOP Faction Organizes for Environment, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 
11, 1996, at Al. 
But times have changed, and the leadership of the Republican Party, to the dismay of 
many of its conservation-minded members, is increasingly seen as out of step with the 
desire of most Americans to safeguard the environment .... The discontent among 
environmentally minded Republicans began last year when GOP congressional leaders 
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McCain, R-AZ, entitled "Nature Is Not a Liberal Plot," which ap-
peared after the 1996 elections, challenging the Republicans in the 
105th Congress to set a more environmentally friendly course.265 An-
other equally powerful gauge of the mindset of the American people 
regarding their environment is the degree of education on environ-
mental issues, which prompted Congress to enact the Environmental 
Education Act of 1990.266 These values have pervaded the schools,267 
and have proliferated in the media with cartoon and television heroes 
of the environment,268 eco-friendly books,269 and membership organi-
Id. 
tried to scale back virtually all of the nation's environmental laws. That attempt was 
blocked in the more moderate Republican-controlled Senate and was criticized, even 
by some House GOP members, as an attack on legitimate environmental safeguards 
supported by a majority of Americans. 
266 See John McCain, Nature Is Not a Liberal Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1996, at A31. "[O]ur 
nation's continued prosperity hinges on our ability to solve environmental problems and sustain 
the natural resources on which we all depend." Id. 
266 See National Environmental Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5501 et seq. (1994). 
(a) Findings. The Congress finds that-
(1) Threats to human health and environmental quality are increasingly complex, 
involving a wide range of conventional and toxic contaminants in the air and water and 
on the land. 
(2) There is growing evidence of international environmental problems, such as global 
warming, ocean pollution, and declines in species diversity, and that these problems 
pose serious threats to human health and the environment on a global scale. 
(3) Environmental problems represent as significant a threat to the quality of life and 
the economic vitality of urban areas as they do the natural balance of rural areas. 
(4) Effective response to complex environmental problems requires understanding 
of the natural and built environment, awareness of environmental problems and their 
origins (including those in urban areas), and the skills to solve these problems. 
(5) Development of effective solutions to environmental problems and effective im-
plementation of environmental programs requires a well educated and trained, profes-
sional work force. 
20 U.S.C. § 5501(a)(1)-(5). 
267 See Karen F. Schmidt, Green Education under Fire; Controversy over Environmental 
Teaching, 274 SCI. 1828, 1830 (1996). "But even as environmental education has gained legiti-
macy and popUlarity, it has come under increasing scrutiny." Id. But see Kate O'Beirne, Filling 
Young Heads: Eco-Brats Are Trained to Target Parents, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Feb. 23, 1997, at 
IE (discussing the use of biased materials in environmental education for children). 
268 See Cynthia Littleton, Cable Nicks Away at Kids Audience; Nickelodeon/Nick at Night 
Channel Wins Children's Television Audiences, 127 BROADCASTING & CABLE 51 (1997). "The 
long-running New Adventures of Captain Planet, Turner Program Services' environmentally 
aware cartoon, traditionally tops a 2 rating with kids 2-11." Id. 
269 "The books range from recycling guides to how-to manuals for craft projects that reuse 
trash. Several are in Spanish. The fiction includes 'The Berenstain Bears Don't Pollute (Any-
more)' and Dr. Seuss' 'The Lorax,' a tale about how shortsighted business concerns can destroy 
the environment." Kathleen Ingley, Kids, Check It Out: 'Green Shelf' Grows At Central Library, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIclPHOENIX GAZETTE, Sept. 25, 1996, at 1. 
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zations.27o A third way is to examine the trends of laws passed and 
regulations enacted throughout the country; this should portray a 
legal trend toward these environmental values. 
A review of these recent trends,271 fortified by the recent history of 
the environmental movement, points to the clear acceptance of some 
level of environmental ethic, as a social interest worthy of protection. 
This is evident by more than just the spontaneity and persistence 
shown by groups interested in this issue; it is a major trend of the 
second half of the twentieth century, and can be likened in many ways 
to the Industrial Revolution. It is the time when humans began to 
understand the workings of the earth, and to take seriously their 
responsibility to preserve the health of the planet. This period will be 
looked back on as the "environmental revolution."272 
C. Law and Environmentally Based Societal Policies 
The identification of policies that are mandated by societal norms 
is the first step in the codification of those policies as law. The whole 
body of environmental laws that have been enacted over the course 
of the past forty years are a testament to that policy and to the 
willingness of society to exact economic costs for the sake of that 
policy. Examples of these laws are presented here in summary to 
demonstrate the movement of society toward the understanding that 
preservation and protection of our natural environment is a positive 
value, and a widespread one. 
There is an increasing awareness of the environment among judges 
that is "reshaping traditional notions of property and the relative 
270 See George Pettinico, Civic Participation and American Democracy; Civic Participation 
Alive and Well in Today's Environmental Groups, 7 THE PUB. PERSP. 27 (1996). 
In fact, a closer examination of the green movement in the United States reveals a 
vibrant, grassroots culture involving countless individuals who are actively engaged 
in their communities. On almost a daily basis, a plethora of meetings, social gatherings, 
hikes, bike trips, clean-up projects, rallies, nature workshops and the like are held in 
communities across the nation by local chapters of national environmental organiza-
tions, as well as ad-hoc community groups. 
Id. at 27. 
271 For millions of Americans, environmentalism is an active pursuit. In response to the 
question: "Do you think of yourself as an active environmentalist, or sympathetic to environ-
mental concerns, but not active, or neutral, or generally unsympathetic to environmental 
concerns?," 5% responded "unsympathetic;" 11% (or 22,000,000 people) characterized them-
selves as "active environmentalists;" 54% were "sympathetic;" and 30% regarded themselves 
as "neutral." See Pettinico, supra note 270, at 27. 
272 See generally Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 
RUTGERS L.J. 395 (1995). 
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claims of private owners and society at large to the use and preser-
vation of land."2'73 That policy is specifically enumerated as the basis 
for law in several cases. In In re Christenson, the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota cited Aldo Leopold.274 
Over ten years ago this court cited the conservationist Aldo Leo-
pold for his espousal of a "land ethic" which envisions a commu-
nity of interdependent parts. "The land ethic simply enlarges the 
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and 
animals, or collectively: the land." We reaffirm our statement 
there that the state's environmental legislation had given this 
land ethic the force of law, and imposed on the courts a duty 
to support the legislative goal of protecting our state's environ-
mental resources.276 
In County of Freeborn v. Bryson, the case referred to above, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota had declared that, "A generation ago, 
the conservationist Aldo Leopold espoused a 'land ethic.' ... In the 
Environmental Rights Act, our state legislature has given this land 
ethic the force of law. Our construction of the Act gives effect to this 
broad remedial purpose."276 
In the case of Department of Community Affairs v. Moorman,'J:l7 
the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a zoning restriction that regu-
lated the use of fences on private property to protect the endangered 
Key Deer.278 The court noted that "we have repeatedly held that 
zoning restrictions must be upheld unless they bear no substantial 
relationship to legitimate societal policies.''279 In defining those "legiti-
mate societal policies," the court noted that "the unregulated erection 
of fencing in the affected area is contrary to Florida's overall policy 
of environmental stewardship."280 
273 See Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Four Opinions on 'Takings,' N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 
1997, at 3. 
274 In re Christenson, 417 N.W.2d 607, 607 (Minn. 1987). See also McLeod County Bd. of 
Comm'rs v. State Dep't. of Natural Resources, 549 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). The 
court in McLeod reaffirmed the Minnesota court's reliance on the ''land ethic." See id. ''The court 
has reaffirmed that the state's environmental legislation had given this land ethic the force of 
law, and imposed on the courts a duty to support the legislative goal of protecting our state's 
environmental resources." Id. at 633. 
275 In re Christenson, 417 N.W.2d at 615 (citations omitted). 
276 County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 316, 322 (Minn. 1976). The Minnesota Environ-
mental Rights Act is located at MINN. STAT. § 116B (West, WESTLAW through 1997). 
2'17 Department of Community Affairs v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 934 (Fla. 1995). 
278 For further information on Florida's Key Deer, see Mireya Navarro, Striking a Balance 
Between Deer and Residents in the Florida Keys, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 18, 1997, at A12. 
279 Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 933. . 
280 Id. 
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Almost every state has some mechanism for the assessment of 
environmental impacts. There is a grassroots movement that has 
proposed an environmental amendment to the U.S. Constitution.281 
Some states, including Illinois,282 Massachusetts,283 Michigan,284 Mon-
tana,285 and Virginia,286 have constitutional provisions that are aimed 
at protecting the environment.287 
The Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1, Section 27, provides: 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historical and esthetic values 
of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are 
the common property of all the people, including generations yet 
to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.288 
It is noted, however, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 
Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,289 held this 
constitutional provision aimed at protecting the environment unen-
forceable because it was not self-executing.290 The court noted that 
"[a] Constitution is primarily a declaration of principles of the funda-
mentallaw."291 That declaration is adequate for the thesis herein that 
281 See Pace Virtual Environmental Law Library (visited Jan. 30, 1998) <http://www.!aw.pace. 
eduJenv/constitution.html>. The proposed amendment reads: "The natural resources of the 
nation are the heritage of present and future generations. The right of each person to clean and 
healthful air and water, and to the protection of the other natural resources, shall not be 
infringed upon by any person." [d. 
282 See ILL. CONST., art. XI, § 1. 
283 See MASS. CONST. amend. IL § 179. 
284 See MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. IV, § 52. 
285 See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3; art. IX, § 1. 
286 See VA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2. 
287 But see Proffitt v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 850 S.W.2d 852, 854 
(Ky. 1993). 
[d. 
Kentucky has no case law, regulation, statute or constitutional requirement which 
creates a duty upon a condemning authority to give consideration to the environmental 
impact of a proposed project beyond those requirements which are already in place 
pursuant to the numerous federal laws on the subject of the environment. Thus, there 
was no state requirement that MSD perform any environmental assessment of appel-
lant's property. 
288 Quoted in Concerned Residents of the Yough, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 639 
A.2d 1265, 1274-75 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994). 
289 Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield 'Ibwer, Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973). 
290 "'Ib summarize, we believe that, the provisions of § 27 of Article 1 of the Constitution [of 
the state of Pennsylvania] merely state the general principle of law that the Commonwealth is 
trustee of Pennsylvania's public natural resources with power to protect the 'natural, scenic, 
historic, and esthetic values' of its environment." [d. at 594-95. 
291 [d. at 198. 
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refers to these laws exactly for the proposition that environmental 
ethics are now embodied in the fundamental law of the United States. 
In other states, courts have used constitutional provisions respect-
ing the environment as the bases for their decisions. Florida courts, 
for instance, have held that environmental factors are appropriate 
matters for consideration by a condemning authority based on Article 
2, Section 7, of the Florida Constitution, which provides in pertinent 
part: "'It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its 
natural resources and scenic beauty."'292 The Louisiana Constitution, 
Article IX, Section 1 provides: "The natural resources of the state, 
including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic 
quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replen-
ished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and 
welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement 
this policy.''2!13 
The Rhode Island Constitution, Section 17 of Article I, provides: 
The people . . . shall be secure in their rights to the use and 
enjoyment of the natural resources of the state with due regard 
for the preservation of their values; and it shall be the duty of the 
general assembly to provide for the conservation of the air, land, 
water, plant, animal, mineral and other natural resources of the 
state, and to adopt all means necessary and proper by law to 
protect the natural environment of the people of the state by 
providing adequate resource planning for the control and regula-
tion of the use of the natural resources of the state and for the 
preservation, regeneration and restoration of the natural environ-
ment of the state.294 
Statutory law has also experienced an influx of environmentally 
based provisions at the federal, state, and locallevels.295 This influx is 
292 See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Berman, 429 So. 2d 79, 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
293 Quoted in Matter of American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 642 So. 2d 1258, 1262 (La. 
1994). "This article continues the Public Trust Doctrine in environmental matters first recog-
nized in the 1921 Constitution's Article VI, § 1 and imposes a duty of environmental protection 
on all state agencies and officials, establishes a standard of environmental protection, and 
mandates the legislature to enact laws to implement fully this policy." Id. See also Save 
Ourselves v. Louisiana Envtl. Contol Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1156 (La. 1984); see also Charles 
S. McCowan, The Evolution of Environmental Law in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 907 (1992). 
This constitutional standard has been interpreted as a "rule of reasonableness" which "requires 
a balancing process in which environmental costs and benefits must be given full and careful 
consideration along with economic, social and other factors." Id. 
294 Quoted in In re Narragansett Elec. Co., 544 A.2d 121, 127 n.3 (R.I. 1988). 
296 In Columbus & Franklin County Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042, 1057 n.17 
(Ohio 1992), the court noted that "environmental statutes are to be liberally construed to effect 
their purposes." 
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exemplified by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 
(NEPA).296 The statute requires that: 
to the fullest extent possible ... all agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment ... include in every recommendation or report on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed state-
ment by the responsible officer on-(i) the environmental impact 
of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects ... 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action ... . "2fY1 
NEPA, however, has been construed as a procedural statute that 
affords no opportunity for the courts to review the substance of an 
agency's decision.298 
At least "[fjourteen States and Puerto Rico have legislated that 
their agencies must use the federal government's environmental im-
pact review procedures. . . . An additional 13 states use portions of 
NEPA's environmental impact assessment (EIA) techniques."299 At 
present, at least thirty-three states use some type of environmental 
impact assessment procedure.3DO Other federal laws that exemplify the 
296 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1994). 
297 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
298 See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 223-28 (1980); see 
generally Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. N.R.D.C., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Philip G. Weinberg, 
It's Time to Put NEPA Back on Course, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.T. 99 (1994). 
299 Jennifer Woodward, Comment, Turning Down the Heat: What United States Laws Can Do 
to Help Ease Global Warming, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 219 (1989); Nicholas A. Robinson, 
SEQRA's Siblings: Precedents from Little NEPA's in the Sister States, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1155 
(1982). 
300 States using NEPA procedures: California (California Environmental Quality Act (West 
1986 & Supp. 1994), CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000--21178.1); Connecticut (Connecticut Envi-
ronmental Protection Act of 1971 (1985 & Supp. 1994), CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-14-20); 
District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-981 -990 (Supp. 1994»; Florida (Florida Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1971, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (West) 1996); Georgia (Georgia 
Environmental Policy Act (1992 & Supp.), GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-16-1-8); Hawaii (HAw. REV. 
STAT. §§ 343-1-8 Supp. (1985 & 1992»; Indiana (IND. CODE §§ 13-1-10-1-8 (1993»; Maryland 
(Maryland Environmental Policy Act 1989, MD. CODE ANN., Nat. Res. §§ 1-301---S05); Massa-
chusetts (Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 30, §§ 61...u2H (1983 & 
Supp. 1994»; Michigan (Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. COMPo LAWS 
ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994»; Minnesota (Minnesota Environmental Policy 
Act of 1973 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994), MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116D.01-.07); Montana (MONT. 
CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101-3-324 (1993»; New York (New York State Environmental Quality 
Review Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101-0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994»; 
North Carolina (North Carolina Environmental Policy Act of 1971, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-
1-10 (1993»; Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico Public Policy Environmental Act, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 
12, §§ 1121-1142 (1977 & Supp. 1991»; South Dakota (South Dakota Environmental Policy Act, 
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 34A-9-1-13 (1992 & Supp. 1994»; Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-
1182-1192 (Michie 1993»; Washington (Washington State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010-.914 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994»; Wisconsin (Wisconsin 
400 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:347 
practice of environmental ethics include Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act301 and the National Forest and Rangeland 
Renewable Resource Planning Act.3OO Other statutory enactments 
also incorporate the values of environmental ethics into the law; the 
Adirondack Park Agency Act303 and the New Jersey Pinelands Pro-
tection Act304 are examples of such laws. These acts and others like 
them attach principles of environmental ethics to distinct areas, such 
as New York State's Adirondack Park306 and New Jersey's unique 
Pine Barrens.306 
On the local level, the Cape Cod Transfer Tax Referendum, which 
provides funding for conservation purposes through a real property 
transfer tax, stands out as one of several local laws aimed at incorpo-
rating environmental ethics into local planning.307 Much of the local 
Environmental Policy Act, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993». See generally 
NICHOLAS c. YOST NEPA DESKBOOK (1995). 
States using portions of NEPA procedures: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. Tit. 49, (1988-1996 
Michie»; Delaware (Delaware Coastal Zone Act, DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 7, §§ 7001-7004 (1991 & 
Supp. 1992»; Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.025 (MichieIBobbs-Merrill 1989 & 
Supp. 1994»; Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 30:2021 (West (1989»; Michigan (Michigan En-
vironmental Protection Act of 1970 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 
§§ 691.1201-.1207; MICH. STAT. ANN. Tit. 13A, Chap. 110B (Lawyers Co-op. 1993»; Mississippi 
(Mississippi Coastal Wetlands Protection Act, MIBB. CODE ANN. § 49-27-27 (1972 & 
Supp. 1994»; Nebraska (Nebraska Environmental Protection Act §§ 81-1501-1532 (1987 & 
Supp. 1993»; Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 321.640-.770 (1994»; New Jersey (New Jersey 
Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1-27 (West 1991 & Supp.l994»; 
Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 519.979 (1993»; Pennsylvania (PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. Tit. 53, § 1611 
(1975»; Rhode Island (Rhode Island Environmental Rights Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10--20--8(b) 
(1985»; Texas (TEXAS STAT. & CODES, TEXAS WATER CODE § 31.015 (1997»; Utah (UTAH CODE 
ANN. Tit. 19 Environmental Quality Code (1953-1996 Michie». 
See also Jeffrey L. Carmichael, Note, The Indiana Environmental Policy Act: Casting a New 
Role fOT a Forgotten Statute, 70 IND. L.J. 613 (1995); FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW § 9.02(1)(a)(ii) (1981); see generally Robinson, supra note 299. 
801 See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq. (1994). 
302 See Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resource Planning Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. 
(1994). 
8ffi See Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 801-20 (McKinney 1982). See gener-
ally Arthur V. Savage & Joseph Sierchio, The Adirondack Park Agency Act: A Regional Land 
Use Plan Confronts "The Taking Issue," 40 ALB. L. REV. 447 (1976); Note, Preserving Scenic 
Areas: The Adirondack Land U8e Program, 84 YALE L.J. 1705 (1975). 
804 See N.J. Permanent Stat. Tit. 13 §§ 13:18A1 to 13:18A-29 (1979). 
306 NASH, supra note 30, at 108--21; see generally FRANK GRAHAM, JR., THE ADIRONDACK 
PARK: A POLITICAL HISTORY (1978). 
806 See generally JOHN A. MCPHEE, THE PINE BARRENS (1968). 
am Governing Review of Developments of Regional Impact, Barnstable County, MA, Ordi-
nance 90--12 (rev. Aug. 13, 1997). Under the Cape Code Commission Act, the Assembly of 
Delegates of Barnstable County adopted enabling regulations governing the commission's re-
view of Developments of Regional Impact. 
1998] ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 401 
legislation is embodied in land use laws. These laws, which attempt 
to infuse environmental ethics, have not been developed in a vacuum, 
but rather are the result of the juxtaposition of law and science, with 
the laws tracking the developments in the science of ecology. 
V. ECOLOGY 
"An owner's liberty to use and manage the thing owned as he 
chooses is in mature systems of law, as in primitive systems, subject 
to the condition that uses harmful to other members of society are 
forbidden."308 The definition of what uses are "harmful" to others can 
be extrapolated from the science of ecology. When combined with the 
philosophical aspects of environmental ethics, the science of ecology 
becomes a potent impetus for the evolution of property rights. It is 
the combination of these two disciplines that thrusts the issue upon 
us, coupled with a growing understanding of the very real dangers 
that confront us globally from misuse of our environments. 
The history of ecology, as described by Donald Worster, is a history 
of ideas.309 
The Eighteenth Century-the Age of Reason, it is often called-
still astonishes us with its fertility of imagination. So much of our 
modern world began then: in politics, the arts, our industrial 
apparatus, science, and philosophy. Not the least among its inno-
vations was the science of ecology. More than two hundred years 
ago men were beginning to put together ecological concepts that 
we have not yet forgotten, such as the ''plenitude of nature," food 
chains, and the notion of equilibrium.31o 
Ecology can be viewed as the study of the human "life-support sys-
tem."3Il As Eugene P. Odum states: 
Life-support environment is that part of the earth that provides 
the physiological necessities oflife, namely, food and other energy, 
mineral nutrients, air, and water. We will use life-support system 
as the functional term for the environment, organisms, processes, 
and resources interacting to provide these physical necessities. 
By processes we mean operations such as food production, water 
recycling, waste assimilation, air purification, and so on. Some of 
308 Honore, supra note 12, at 123. 
309 See generally DONALD WORSTER, NATURE'S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL 
IDEAS (1977). 
810 [d. at 2. 
311 See generally EUGENE P. ODUM, ECOLOGY AND OUR ENDANGERED LIFE-SUPPORT SyS-
TEMS (1989). 
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these processes are organized and controlled by humans, but 
many are natural and driven by solar or other natural energies. 
All life-supporting processes involve the activities of organisms 
other than humans-plants, animals, and microbes.3l2 
Robert Leo Smith postulates a wider definition: 
Ecology is the study of the structure and function of nature. 
Structure includes the distribution and abundance of organ-
isms as influenced by the biotic and abiotic elements of the envi-
ronment; and function includes how populations grow and inter-
act, including competition, predation, parasitism, mutualisms, and 
transfers of nutrients and energy.3l3 
Though these definitions have by no means been discredited, there 
are newer paradigms being discussed and developed. 
A new ecological paradigm has emerged that recognizes ecological 
systems to be open, regulated by events arising outside of their 
boundaries, lacking or prevented from attaining a stable point 
equilibrium, affected by natural disturbance, and incorporating 
humans and their effects. A new metaphor of the flux of nature 
symbolizes the new, or nonequilibrium, paradigm effectively.3l4 
Each of these definitions, as well as their forebears, references the 
patterns and processes of nature, and stresses their relationships. In 
each of the definitions the effect of human behavior is, at least, im-
plicit. The evolution of the definition is a testament to the acceptance 
of the degree of human impact, and an acknowledgment of its ever-
increasing potency. It is unquestionable that human technology has 
developed to the point where we can destroy significant elements of 
our life-support system. It is that knowledge, coupled with the ever-
growing body of knowledge that documents the effect of localized 
human actions on the life-support system, that mandates considera-
tion of all of the consequences of human activity on the environment. 
The science of ecology, besides teaching the relationship between 
humans and their environment, also provides the research tool with 
which these impacts can be studied, analyzed, and evaluated. This 
understanding is the factor that militates for the infusion of the values 
of "environmental ethics" into real property law. 
312 [d. at 13 (emphasis added). 
313 ROBERT LEO SMITH, ECOLOGY AND FIELD BIOLOGY 3 (4th ed. 1990). 
314 S.T.A. Pickett & Richard S. Ostfield, The Shifting Paradigm in Ecology, in A NEW 
CENTURY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 275 (Richard L. Knight & Sarah F. Bates 
eds., 1995). 
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The science of ecology is an important factor in the definition of 
"harmful use," the prohibition of which is one generally accepted 
"stick" of real property ownership. In the "prohibition of harmful 
use," the ecological systems must be considered, and this could affect 
otherwise legal conduct on the property. As Aldo Leopold wrote: 
[the] farmer who clears the woods off a 75 percent slope, turns his 
cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into 
the community creek is still (if otherwise decent) a respected 
member of society. If he puts lime on his fields and plants his crops 
on contour, he is still entitled to all the privileges and emoluments 
of his Soil Conservation District.315 
Leopold is referring to behavior that is generally legal and often 
encouraged despite its potentially detrimental effects. It is generally 
accepted that the use of nutrient-rich fertilizers on suburban lawns 
contributes to the runoff that can cause eutrophication,316 but very 
little effort has been made to control this problem. Similar types of 
runoff from agricultural uses threaten water supplies. Other exam-
ples include the use of buffer zones to apply a necessary level of 
protection to preserved land.317 
The creation of a stick which takes into account the environmental 
context of real property must also be based on solid ecological science. 
This is the green wood, the live stick firmly rooted in the earth from 
which it sprouted, and closely tied to the environment which nurtured 
its progression from seedling to maturity. These additions to real 
property law are essential in dealing with the decline in incremental 
improvements in pollution control, and the failure of current environ-
mental laws to further the environmental ethic. The nature of non-
point source pollution and the fact that its causes include otherwise 
legal activity is an important ecological problem that could be man-
aged by the real property approach, while efforts to impose regula-
tory solutions have come up short. 
316 LEOPOLD, supra note 32, at 245-46. 
316 "A process of aging of lakes whereby aquatic plants are abundant and waters are deficient 
in oxygen. The process is usually accelerated by enrichment of waters with surface runoff 
containing nitrogen and phosphorus." NYLE C. BRADY, THE NATURE AND PROPERTIES OF 
SOILS 585 (1990). 
317 This is certainly not to be confused with an increase in the size of the protected area, but 
refers to planning for uses within the buffer that have less of an impact on the preserve. 
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A. The Nature of Land 
What is it about land itself that makes it unique and mandates its 
distinction?318 The answer justifies the difference in the treatment of 
the lots at issue in Lucas and a parking lot in Manhattan. These 
differences are based upon the natural state of affairs that inexorably 
govern the site. A wetland, for instance, has certain properties that 
transcend the ownership of an individual, despite the ancient miscon-
ceptions that made reclamation a legitimate public policy in the past. 
These very physical facts inhere in the title to the land because they 
are inextricably interwoven into the physical facts that inhere to a 
parcel of land. Actions to protect these lands, though nominally made 
in the name of ecology or environmental protection, afford very real 
physical benefits as their bases. While some may see wetland preser-
vation as an end in and of itself, the ecologist views the wetland as an 
ecosystem that provides demonstrable tangible benefits. "Wetlands in 
their natural state are a source of substantial benefit for society."319 
According to wetland researcher Curtis J. Richardson, these values 
include: 
1. Flood control (conveyance), flood storage; 
2. Sediment control (filter for waste); 
3. Wastewater treatment system; 
4. Nutrient removal from agricultural runoff and wastewater sys-
tems; 
5. Recreation; 
6. Open space; 
7. Visual aesthetics and cultural benefits; 
8. Hunting (fur bearers, beavers, muskrats); 
9. Preservation of flora and fauna (endemic and refuge); 
10. Timber production; 
11. Shrub crops (cranberry and blueberry); 
12. Medical uses (streptomycin); 
13. Education and research; 
14. Erosion control; 
15. Food production (shrimp, fish, ducks); 
318 The belief that land is a unique type of property which mandates its unique treatment is 
anything but settled. See Fred P. Bosselman, Land as a Privileged Form of Property, in 
TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND 
LUCAS 29 (David L. Callies ed., 1996). "The social distinction that reinforced land's uniqueness 
in England two centuries ago seems anachronistic today." [d. at 42. "Whether one believes that 
the modern regulatory environment is too tight, too loose, or just right, it is difficult to devise 
logical arguments for applying one standard to land and another for other investments." [d. The 
scientific reasons for treatment of land as a unique type of property are posited herein. 
319W. VanVuuren & P. Roy, Private and Social Returns from Wetland Preservation Versus 
Thosefrom Wetland Conversion to Agriculture, 8 ECOL. ECON. 289 (1992). 
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16. Historical, cultural, and archaeological resources; 
17. Threatened, rare, and endangered species habitat; 
18. Water quality; 
19. Water supply.320 
Though many of these values are ecological in nature, and hence are 
"not exclusive, transferable, or enforceable, the ecological or non-
market values of wetlands are not priced or traded in the market."321 
However, a "contingent valuation method" has been shown to esti-
mate wetlands benefits in lieu of market data.322 A contingent market 
is a hypothetical market, into which a change will be made, and a 
survey is compiled based on that change and the question of what is 
the maximum amount of money one would pay for preservation of the 
resource.323 
There is doubtless confusion that has arisen based on the reversal 
in wetlands policy that has been driven by scientific developments 
over the course of the past fifty years. During that time, wetlands, 
which were seen as breeding grounds for disease, have been exoner-
ated and elevated to a position of high regard. In 1915, the Supreme 
Court in the case of O'Neill v. Leamer, noted: 
In our opinion, it is too late in the day to contend that the irriga-
tion of arid lands, the straightening and improvement of water-
courses, the building of levees and the draining of swamp and 
overflowed lands for the improvement of the health and comfort 
of the community, and the reclamation of waste places and the 
promotion of agriculture, are not all and every of them subjects 
of general and public concern, the promotion and regulation of 
which are among the most important of governmental powers, 
duties and functions.324 
In Florida Rock Industries v. United States, the Unites States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia wrote: 
[O]ne who remembers when wetlands were called swamps,326 
when their draining or filling was deemed progress, and when 
their main environmental impact was in the production of noxious 
disease-bearing mosquitoes, and who has observed their present 
320 See Curtis J. Richardson, Ecological Functions and Human Values in Wetlands: A Frame-
work for Assessing Forestry Impacts, 14 WETLANDS 1, 3 (1994). 
321 See id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
322 See John C. Whitehead, Measuring Willingness to Pay for Wetlands Preservation with the 
Contingent Valuation Method, 10 WETLANDS 187 (1990). 
323 See id. at 189. 
324 O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244, 252 (1915). 
326 Wetlands are still called swamps and marshes, mangroves, peatlands, etc. See generally 
WILLIAM J. MITSCH & JAMES G. GoSSELINK, WETLANDS (1993). 
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status, will not be astonished if some day a mosquito bred in a 
swamp bites someone and infects him with malaria, and the old 
beliefs revive.326 
In Zealy v. City of Waukesha, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin wrote: 
[S]wamps and wetlands were once considered wasteland, undesir-
able, and not picturesque. But as people became more sophisti-
cated, an appreciation was acquired that swamps and wetlands 
serve a vital role in nature, are part of the balance of nature and 
are essential to the purity of the water in our lakes and streams. 
Swamps and wetlands are a necessary part of the ecological crea-
tion and now, even to the uninitiated, possess their own beauty in 
nature.327 
In Zealy, the court dismissed a landowner's claim of a taking when 
his entire parcel was the subject of conservation zoning. Wetlands are 
yet another example of the evolution of what was once tolerable 
(filling of wetlands) to what is now intolerable. 
While Zealy involved a zoning change made after the landowner 
came into title, the issue of landowners who purchase land with ex-
isting restrictions presents an interesting quandary. Why is the pur-
chaser of land not responsible for taking account of the physical facts 
which regard his parcel? This has impact on the recent decisions of 
the New York Court of Appeals discussed infra, but transcends those 
cases to address the basic issue of the buyer's expectations. If a buyer 
purchased land with a wetland on it, how could that physical fact 
responsibly be ignored? Prior to the more recent understanding of the 
importance of wetland ecosystems, the common knowledge was that 
these wetlands were unhealthful, and owners were forced to fill them, 
a practice also known as reclamation. This amounted to a notice that 
the property indeed was impaired by a physical reality. Today, with 
the enactment of wetland protection laws, a fortiori, the buyer cannot 
claim ignorance of the physical fact, nor of the laws which pertain to 
this reality. 
The basis for infusing ecology into real property law is that ecology 
is real property science. Ecology is the science that identifies the 
systems which run the earth, and that establishes scientifically plau-
sible connections between the actions of real property owners/users 
326 Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
327 Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 534-85 (Wis. 1996) (quoting Just v. Marinette 
County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 766-67 (Wis. 1972». 
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and the results of those actions on that real property and on other 
ecosystems. 
VI. GREEN WOOD IN THE BUNDLE OF STICKS 
We are a young people and have not learned by experience the conse-
quence of cutting off the forest. One day they will be replanted, me-
thinks, and nature reinstated to some extent. 
-Henry David Thoreau328 
To synthesize real property law, environmental ethics, and ecology, 
it is necessary to proffer the following hypothesis: The law of owner-
ship, regarding real property, has evolved to a conceptual level that 
ignores the res, the property itself. Real property, land or earth, is 
sufficiently unique when viewed under the methodology of the ecolo-
gist to warrant consideration of its characteristics when aggregating 
the bundle of sticks. The consideration of these characteristics and 
the values appurtenant thereto cannot be made in a vacuum, but must 
be evaluated in light of the well-developed body of societal principles 
known as environmental ethics. 
For the purpose of understanding and furthering this hypothesis, 
it is necessary to understand the nature and development of modern 
real property ownership law, especially with regard to its evolution, 
and its ability to follow societal mores through the mechanism of the 
common law. "Law defines a relation not always between fixed points, 
but often, indeed oftenest, between points of varying position. The act 
and situations to be regulated have a motion of their own. There is 
change whether we will it or not."329 
Why real property law? The history of the contemporary environ-
mental movement has shown a trend toward what have been termed 
command-and-control regulations. It is unquestionable that these 
have contributed to significant gains in environmental protection, 
though some would argue that these benefits have come at the cost 
of property rights. The need for a vehicle that infuses environmental 
ethics at an individual level is clear when the diminishing returns from 
regulation are examined. That is not to say that these regulations will 
be replaced or even curtailed by a real property law that considers 
ecology and environmental ethics. There is ample room for the real 
property law to effect changes in areas that are (or have been proven 
328 Henry David Thoreau, Journal, in 3 THE WORKS OF HENRY THOREAU 461-{i2 (1949). 
329 CARDOZO, supra note 45, at 11. 
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to be) difficult for regulation to reach. These include the major issues 
such as the reach of the commerce clause to localized activities in light 
of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, which 
seems to require that the affected activity substantially affect inter-
state commerce.330 
The evolution of real property law is well documented, and evi-
dences the impact of social and physical facts in its history. It is well 
noted that "property has not been an absolute concept. Instead its 
definition has been conventional and has evolved as community con-
sensus about individual-public balance has evolved. In the last 
twenty-five years, the conversation inevitably has encompassed the 
knowledge imparted by holistic, ecological science."331 
The study of ecology and its most basic tenets is crucial to present 
earth or land as a biotic component of our environment, rather than 
an inert, fungible thing. Ecology animates real property and allows 
us to understand its uniqueness. The understanding that the study of 
real property and ecology provides for us, in terms of land or earth, 
would be vacuous in the absence of some societal sense of value with 
which to use this understanding. The development of environmental 
ethics fills that void, and must be analyzed both on the theoretical 
level and on the practical level. Environmental ethics have become 
part of our societal ethos; it is just a question of identifying the degree 
of that infusion and applying it to our practices.332 
830 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that possession of a handgun 
in a local school zone did not substantially affect interstate commerce). 
331 Duncan, 8Upra note 191, at 1159. 
832 There are extra-legal barriers to the implementation of a system based on environmental 
ethics. "Critics of a 'social ethic' see it as no less than 'communistic infiltration.'" 5A POWELL, 
8Upra note 14, .. 746. It is well noted that the distinction that A.M. Honor~ makes between the 
nature of ownership in a "socialist" society and a more ''liberal'' society (one which recognizes 
full ownership), is a limitation in the "range of things that can be owned," rather than a 
distinction of the incidents of ownership of that property which can be owned. Honor~, supra 
note 12, at 110 (citation omitted). Popular opinion exists of "property rights" engrained into the 
U.S. Constitution. This is a difficult conception to dispel. The Constitution is a product of the 
times and thoughts of a group of landowning males, at the brink of an under-populated and 
virtually unexplored continent, who had been through a revolution, but importantly, had also 
been through a period of ineffective governance, which led to the need for a constitution, and a 
federal government. The Constitution was not the direct product of the revolution, but of the 
inability of the newly free colonies to thrive without union and some centralization. N everthe-
less, "[n]ever did an instrument receive from a nation the respect, the reverence-I may say 
the idolatry almost-which the Constitution of the United States has received from the Ameri-
can people." L. BRADFORD PRINCE, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
vs. THE CONSTITUTION 44 (1867). 
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An estate in land is never absolute. It has been and remains subject 
to limitations, which, though supplemented by the laws of nuisance 
and trespass, are not solely their product. While these limitations are 
the product of the very common law that spawned the estates in 
property, their existence has evolved with cultural, philosophical, and 
scientific progress. Their existence is attested to by most commenta-
tors, and notably by the Supreme Court in Lucas.333 The vexing issue 
is the current definition of those limitations, the role that the science 
of ecology and the philosophy of environmental ethics have to play in 
those limitations, and the evolution of those limitations to coincide 
with the increase in knowledge of a global ecosystem. 
As one looks back along the historic road traversed by the law of 
land in England and in America, one sees a change from the 
viewpoint that he who owns may do as he pleases with what he 
owns, to a position which hesitatingly embodies an ingredient of 
stewardship; which grudgingly, but steadily, broadens the recog-
nized scope of social interest in the utilization of things.334 
There is some recognition that the law of real property ownership will 
evolve further to accommodate environmental ethics in a stewardship 
setting.335 That recognition, however, is restricted to a regrettably few 
commentators who dare to challenge the popularly purported basic 
assumptions of both common law and constitutional law. 
Like the social changes that eviscerated the Lochner decision, the 
evolution of real property ownership in America has brought the law 
of real property to the point where contemporary social ideals are 
part of its very fabric.336 The law of real property ownership has 
recognized the needs of the colonial period and its mandate for pro-
ductive use of lands, and protection of the community from outside 
333 See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
334 5A POWELL, supra note 14, ~ 746; see generally HORWITZ, 1780-1860, supra note 20; 
HORWITZ, 1870-1960, supra note 20. 
336 See generally Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environ-
mental Ethics, 24 ENVTL. L. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Rose, Given-ness]. 
Property thus includes a normative "deep structure" that may be of use in an environ-
mental ethic. The norms that lurk in property go beyond the wondrous power of 
exclusion that so awed Blackstone in the case of individual property. They include as 
well the qualities of restraint and responsibility that characterize common or shared 
property. 
[d. at 28 (footnote omitted). 
336 "The interest of the community then is, what? the sum of the interests of the several 
members who compose it." J.H. BURNS & H.L.A. HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 
OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION/JEREMY BENTHAM 12 (1982). "A measure of government (which 
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attack. The manifest destiny was afforded its broad reach with modi-
fication to the nature of the estate in land and the allowance for broad 
expansion into the western part of the continent. The Industrial 
Revolution was accommodated by evolution of the nature of owner-
ship, and so was the modern era. The changes that have been mani-
fested by recent decades of ecological understanding and the growing 
environmental ethic, the environmental revolution, must be acknow-
ledged and accepted into the metaphor of real property ownership.337 
The law itself has been compared to a living organism that is capable 
of expanding and adapting to both the needs and spirit of a modern 
society.338 
The common law is supposed to respond to public opinion and to 
reflect with more or less fidelity the moral and ethical sentiments 
of the people. It is, of course, too much to expect that law in the 
natural process of evolution should ever be fully abreast of public 
sentiment; but in all conscience it ought not to be several centu-
ries behind the times.339 
"The principles, then, serve as a reminder that a satisfactory ex-
amination of property must weave together the theoretical and the 
concrete, and help to solve real-world problems. A theory of property 
should not be an intellectual plaything but an instrument for reform-
ing institutions of property."340 These changes can be construed as 
being both a function of common law nuisance and an element of the 
estate in real property. The sticks in the bundle of property rights are 
elemental in integrating these principles into law and include the 
prohibition of harmful use,54! and a duty of environmental context. 
Inclusion of both of these sticks as inextricable parts of the bundle is 
is but a particular kind of action, performed by a particular person or persons) may be said to 
be conformable to or dictated by the principle of utility, when in like manner the tendency which 
it has to augment the hapiness of the community is greater than any which it has to diminish 
it." [d. at 13. 
337 In Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 189 (Wis. 1982), the court construed the policies which 
had once (during the Industrial Revolution) limited the right of a landowner to sunlight. These 
policies facilitated the construction of large plants and towering skyscrapers, leaving adjacent 
landowners in the shadows. See id. These were (1) the "right of landowners to do as they 
wishedj" (2) the view of "sunlight as only aestheticj" and (3) that "society had a significant 
interest in not restricting development." [d. The court noted the changed policies in ruling that 
"[t]hese three policies are no longer fully accepted or applicable. They reflect factual circum-
stances and social priorities that are now obsolete." [d. 
338 See Rumble, supra note 17, at 308. 
889 [d. at 315. 
840 MUNZER, supra note 1, at 469. 
841 As reconciled with the "right to consume or destroy." 
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mandated by society's growing understanding of the science of ecol-
ogy and the infusion of environmental ethics into our philosophy of 
law. The former needs only to be expanded upon to elaborate its role 
as the stick that integrates nuisance law into the estate, and further 
integrates ecological nuisance into the estate. The latter is a duty that 
has arisen based upon the societal movement342 toward the acceptance 
of some degree of environmental ethics, and should also fit within the 
estate in land. Its justification is ethical in essence, and its scope is 
defined by ecological principles that govern the limitations on human 
disturbance of ecosystems, in accordance with the understanding fos-
tered by the most current paradigm in ecology. The duty of environ-
mental context is the stick that is the green wood in the bundle. It is 
the one stick that is dependent on the individual nature of the specific 
real property, and is therefore planted firmly in the ground. 
The inclusion of this green wood into the bundle is evolutionary, not 
revolutionary. It will promote an understanding that existing rules 
and sources, which though implicit, are part of our value system and 
therefore the essence of our real property law, mandate environ-
mental protection.343 It will not effect a moratorium on development, 
but perhaps stimulate a more substantive environmental impact as-
sessment process, and greater adherence to a land use scheme that 
also must be prepared in accordance with that procedure. 
The examination of the historical and philosophical bases for the 
current metaphor for property ownership reveals its strengths and 
frailties. As Professor Joseph Sax has suggested, the current model 
might be replaced with one based on the principle of usufructuary 
rights.344 While Professor Sax is correct in his analysis, the question 
342 "The book of life changes, and the values revealed to us today may be different from those 
that will be revealed to us tomorrow." CARDOZO, supra note 45, at 59. 
343 In Lucas, the Court stated the following: 
In light of our traditional resort to "existing rules or understandings that stem from 
an independent source such as state law" to define the range of interests that qualify 
for protection as "property" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [citations 
omitted] This recognition that the Takings Clause does not require compensation when 
an owner is barred from putting land to a use that is proscribed by those "existing 
rules or understandings" is surely unexceptional. When, however, a regulation that 
declares "off-limits" all economically productive or beneficial uses of land goes beyond 
what the relevant background principles would dictate, compensation must be paid to 
sustain it. 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1030 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
344Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and t1u3 Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1452 (1993) [hereinafter Sax, Property 
Rights]. 
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of whether the paradigm of ownership had ever left the realm of 
usufruct, except in metaphor, is one that is based on the history of 
ownership, and cannot easily be dismissed. Within the usufructuary 
framework, a metaphor of property ownership could be accomplished 
which incorporates the science of ecology and the ethic inspired by 
AIdo Leopold. As Professor Sax states, "property can serve two 
masters: the community and the individual."845 In setting the parame-
ters for green wood it is necessary to consider the realm of the 
usufruct, to promote equity, while recognizing the uniqueness of each 
parcel of land. However, since the concept of usufruct is so fundamen-
tally alien to the American people, when placed as a restriction on 
their ownership of property, its likelihood for institutionalization is 
minimal. 
The very metaphor that is used to describe property and its under-
lying connotation as rights rather than things, has limited our appli-
cation of environmental values that society has accepted. While it is 
true that the concept of property is somewhat vacuous when thing-
oriented, it is also deficient when the definition is devoid of reference 
to it. The absence of this reference is particularly troubling with 
regard to real property. In an effort to raise the theory of property 
to a universal and highly intellectual principle,346 the res was forgot-
ten. The bundle of sticks has no ties to the ground. In the absence of 
a theoretical connection to the real nature of real property, the treat-
ment of it, without regard to any environmental implications is inevi-
table. The upshot is that the Supreme Court in Lucas347 could treat 
the property as any other parcel of land, regardless of its location and 
circumstances. 
Perhaps it is time for the common law to root the bundle of sticks 
for real property to the ground, and thereby ground the theoretical 
notion of property with the current reality of ecology and the societal 
values comprising environmental ethics. As Oliver Wendell Holmes 
has stated, "The life of the [common] law has not been logic: it has 
been experience."348 
345 Id. at 1453. 
346 The principle is known as the unified "quantum" theory of property. 
847 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. 
346 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881). 
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A. Green Wood Grows in New York 
In the exercise of its legitimate police power, the government may 
regulate, but the state of the law after the decision of the Supreme 
Court in the case of Lucas would indicate that the pursuit of purely 
ecological goals is subject to compensation.349 In two areas the gov-
ernment's right to regulate without liability for compensation remains 
clear: (1) where the action prevented is a nuisance under the common 
law;360 and (2) where the "proscribed use interests were not part of 
his title to begin with [and less than a total taking]."361 This, the Court 
terms, is the "logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the 
owner's estate."362 
According to Professor Joseph L. Sax, "[h]istorically, property de-
finitions have continuously adjusted to reflect new economic and social 
structures, often to the disadvantage of existing owners."363 This his-
tory is well documented and has been the subject of numerous studies 
invoking the evolution of property law as justification of later devel-
opments in that body oflaw.364 The infusion of the environmental ethic 
discussed above into that law may be seen as the natural progression 
in the evolution of property law.356 Though stumbling blocks may 
exist, such as the majority opinion in Lucas, the science of ecology 
and the environmental ethic will affect the path of evolution of real 
property law. This is certainly the fate of real property law, which we 
will view in retrospect much as we now view the property law which 
evolved around and bolstered human slavery, that peculiar institution 
which was tolerated, and indeed encouraged by our system of laws.366 
849 Some commentators have questioned whether the import of the Lucas decision is a direct 
challenge to regulation based purely on ecological bases. "In general, Lucas addresses legislation 
imposed to maintain ecological services performed by land in its natural state." Sax, Property 
Rights, supra note 344, at 1439. 
360 In Colorado Dep't. of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1994), the Supreme Court 
of Colorado held that under the common law of the state, any land use that causes pollution is 
a nuisance. 
851 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. 
36l!ld. 
363 Sax, Property Rights, supra note 344, at 1446. 
354 See id. 
3Ii6 "An adjustment may even be effected between economic and aesthetic values. The land-
owner will not be compelled to forego every profitable use of his land, but in some jurisdictions 
it is at least an open question whether a restriction may not be placed upon the construction of 
unsightly signs." CARDOZO, supra note 45, at 58-59. 
IlIi6 See generally KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE 
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956). 
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In a sense, the majority in Uucas was attempting to burn a bridge 
behind it to prevent a maelstrom of ecologically based environmental 
regulation from taking hold.367 It is the thesis of this Article that such 
regulation is the next step in the natural and omnipresent evolution 
of real property law. 
Ironically, it is the Uucas case that challenges us to devise and 
develop an evolutionary trend in real property ownership law, which 
will add the consideration of purely ecological and environmentally 
ethical restrictions on the use of private property. The Lucas case 
presents itself as a speed bump on the road to the infusion of environ-
mental ethics into our regulation of real property.368 As such, it chal-
lenges us to explore the avenues which it excepts from being defined 
as takings: nuisance369 and the nature of the estate owned. 
357 The Court stated the following: 
The many statutes on the books, both state and federal, that provide for the use of 
eminent domain to impose servitudes on private scenic lands preventing developmen-
tal uses, or to acquire such lands altogether, suggest the practical equivalence in this 
setting of negative regulation and appropriation. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 41Off-1(a) 
(authorizing acquisition of "lands, waters, or interests [within Channel Islands National 
Park] (including but not limited to scenic easements)"); § 460aa-2(a) (authorizing ac-
quisition of "any lands, or lesser interests therein, including mineral interests and 
scenic easements" within Sawtooth National Recreation Area); §§ 3921--3923 (author-
izing acquisition of wetlands); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-38 (1990) (authorizing acquisition 
of, inter alia, "scenic easements" within the North Carolina natural and scenic rivers 
system); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 11-15-101-11-15-108 (1987) (authorizing acquisition of 
"protective easements" and other rights in real property adjacent to State's historic, 
architectural, archaeological, or cultural resources). 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018-19 (1991). 
368 In Del Monte Dunes at Monterey v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1429 (9th Cir. 1996), 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit evaluated the trial court's jury instruction, which 
contained the following: 
Public bodies, such as the city, have the authority to take actions which substantially 
advance legitimate public interest and legitimate public interest can include protecting 
the environment, preserving open space agriculture, protecting the health and safety 
of its citizens, and regulating the quality of the community by looking at development. 
So one of your jobs as jurors is to decide if the city's decision here substantially 
advanced any such legitimate public purpose. 
This case makes the determination of the validity of a regulation a question of fact! In essence, 
the jury's opinion is substituted for that of the legislature. 
869 One commentator suggested the following: 
The greatest long term importance of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council may 
lie in the Supreme Court's adoption of the common law of nuisance as a criterion of 
regulatory legitimacy. By using this criterion, the judiciary will be required to substi-
tute its own judgments of right and wrong for that of the legislature in the land use 
field. 
John A. Humbach, "Taking" the Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Properly Interests 
and Judicial Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771, 815-16 (1993) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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Nevertheless, to be more than an intellectual exercise, this thesis 
must delineate the parameters that will work within the Lucas re-
strictions, to allow for regulations solely based on ecological need to 
pass muster as a part of the bundle of rights that are affected by the 
natural evolution of ownership: 
1. Green wood looks at real property as unique, and therefore of 
value360 even when unusable.361 This basic fact deflates the fiction in 
the Lucas case that the property considered therein had no value. No 
360 What is unquestionably of value under an environmental ethic and what is considered of 
value based on the constitution are obviously two different things. See generally Holmes 
Rolston, III, Valuing Wildlands, 7 ENVTL. ETHICS 23 (1985); Holmes Rolston, III, Values in 
Nature, 3 ENVTL. ETHICS 113 (1981); Whitehead, supra note 322. 
361 The Court in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, actually justifies the "test" for a taking by citing a 
definition of land as only profits. 
The second situation in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate is 
where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land. As we 
have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use 
regulation "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an 
owner economically viable use of his land." We have never set forth the justification 
for this rule. Perhaps it is simply, as Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation 
of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical 
appropriation. 
See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "For 
what is the land but the profits thereof?" 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES ch. 1, 1 (1st Am. ed. 1812). 
Surely, at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial 
use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legislature 
is simply "adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life," Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), in a manner that secures an "average reciprocity of 
advantage" to everyone concerned. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
And the functional basis for permitting the government, by regulation, to affect property values 
without compensation-that "government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident 
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law," 
id. at 413-does not apply to the relatively rare situations where the government has deprived 
a landowner of all economically beneficial uses. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-18 (citations omitted) 
(footnotes omitted). Justice Brennan takes the quote of Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) somewhat 
out of context. 
But if a man seised of lands in fee by his deed granteth to another the profit of those 
lands, to have and to hold to him and his heires, and maketh livery secundum formam 
chartm, [according to the deed] the whole land itself doth passe; for what is the land 
but the profit thereof; for thereby vesture, herbage, trees, mines, and all whatsoever 
parcell of that land doth passe. 
COKE, supra note 11, at 4b. This passage follows a declaration by Coke that: 
[l]and is anciently called Fleth; but land builded is more worthy than other land, 
because it is for the habitation of man, and in that respect both the precedency to be 
determined in the first place in a prmcipe as hereafter shall be said .... For as the 
heavens are the habitation of Almightie God, so the earth hath he appointed as the 
suburbs of heaven to be the habitation of man. 
[d. at 4a. 
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piece of land can be considered to be without value or substantially 
without value.362 
2. Regulation based wholly on ecological principles is: (A) valid exer-
cises of police power; and (B) by definition aimed at the relief of a 
public nuisance.363 
3. Mandating the maintenance of environmental context does not alter 
the value of the real property as to invoke a taking.364 
362 But see Del Monte Dunes, 95 F.3d at 1422. In this case, a jury in the trial court below 
construed the question of whether there was an economically viable use remaining in the subject 
property, a 190-unit residential development. U[W]e first tum to determining whether the 
existence of an economically viable use falls within the category of essentially factual questions, 
which may be submitted to a jury. We hold it does." [d. at 1428. The court found that U[t]he 
Supreme Court has suggested that where an owner is denied only some economically viable 
uses, a taking still may have occurred where government action has a sufficient economic impact 
and interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations." [d. at 1432. Interestingly, the 
court in Del Monte Dunes upheld the jury verdict of "no economically viable use" despite the 
fact that the owner had sold the property to the state of California for $800,000 more than it 
had paid for the site. [d. The court then attempted to rationalize this glaring inconsistency by 
declaring that "it is not difficult to conceive of a circumstance in which there are no economically 
viable uses for a property, but the property owner can sell it to the government at a higher 
price than what he paid for it." [d. The court then abruptly declared that "[a]lthough the value 
of the subject property is relevant to the economically viable use inquiry, our focus is primarily 
on use, not value." Del Monte Dunes, 95 F.3d at 1443. They then offered a ''test: ... where, as 
Del Monte argued in this case, government action relegates permissible uses of property to 
those consistent with leaving the property in its natural state (e.g., nature preserve or public 
space), and no competitive market exists for the property without the possibility of develop-
ment, a taking may have occurred. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1157 (1993) 
(discussing analogy between condemned land and land required to be left in its natural state)." 
[d. (other citations omitted). 
863 Examples of activities that could be permissibly regulated, without being takings, are cited 
by the Lucas Court. 
On this analysis, the owner of a lake bed, for example, would not be entitled to 
compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling opera-
tion that would have the effect of flooding others' land. Nor the corporate owner of a 
nuclear generating plant, when it is directed to remove all improvements from its land 
upon discovery that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault. Such regulatory action 
may well have the effect of eliminating the land's only economically productive use, but 
it does not proscribe a productive use that was previously permissible under relevant 
property and nuisance principles. 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-80 (1991). It is difficult to distin-
guish the aforementioned fact patterns from the Lucas facts, but it is clear that the recognition 
of the value of green wood would mandate the equation of the ecologically based regulation with 
those cited. 
864 Following the logic of the examples cited in Lucas, the owner of a wetland, like the owner 
of Justice Scalia's hypothetical "lake bed," would not be entitled to compensation when he is 
denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect of 
flooding others' land. This follows despite the fact that the flooding might be an indirect 
consequence of the landfill rather than a direct overflow of water from the site. The natural 
ability of the wetland to provide flood protection must be considered. Likewise, the landowner 
who discovers the endangered species on his property is analogous to the power plant owner 
who finds that her/his plant is located on a fault. 
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These attributes therefore can be built into the owner's estate, if 
incorporated therein under state law. 
Three cases recently decided by the New York State Court of 
Appeals366 have construed the Lucas Court's criteria of "logically an-
tecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate."366 The case of 
Kim v. City of New York367 has construed the nature of the owner's 
estate to be governed both by state common law and statutory law. 
The corpus juris of this State comprises constitutional law, statu-
tory law and common law. To the extent that each of these sources 
establishes binding rules of property law, each plays a role in de-
fining the rights and restrictions contained in a property owner's 
title. Therefore, in identifying the background rules of State prop-
erty law that inhere in an owner's title, a court should look to the 
law in force, whatever its source, when the owner acquired the 
property.368 
The court's efforts to use the entire corpus juris of the state harkens 
back to Blackstone's broad definition of property, which he modifies 
with "save only by the laws of the land."369 
This case involved the use of a portion of plaintiff's property to 
provide lateral support for an adjacent roadway. The court held that 
the plaintiffs were on constructive notice when they acquired the 
property "that the property abutted a public road that was below the 
legal grade."370 In analyzing the issue of takings, the court wrote that 
"regardless of whether this case is characterized as a physical or 
regulatory taking, a question we do not reach, our analysis starts with 
a search into the bundle of rights and concomitant obligations con-
tained in plaintiffs' title."371 The court then proceeded to occupy the 
role that the Lucas Court presumably intended by its reference to 
the "logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's es-
tate."372 In their evaluation of the nature of the owner's estate under 
365 Four cases were decided on that date regarding this issue: Kim v. City of New York, 681 
N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997); Gazza v. New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 678 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 
1997); Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1997); Basile v. Town of Southamp-
ton, 678 N.E.2d 489 (N.Y. 1997). The Basile case is not considered herein. 
366 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. 
367 Kim, 681 N.E.2d at 312. 
368 [d. at 315-16 (citations omitted). 
369 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 138. 
370 Kim, 681 N.E.2d at 313. 
371 [d. at 314-15. 
372 The court noted: 
[I]t has been suggested that this "logically antecedent inquiry" into the owner's title 
should be limited to a review of those property and nuisance rules recognized at 
common law, and that statutory law should not factor into the analysis .... Some 
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state law, the New York court found that "the lateral-support obliga-
tion imposed on plaintiffs was a prevailing rule of the State's property 
law when they acquired their property and, accordingly, encumbered 
plaintiffs' title and the constituent bundle of rights."373 Therefore no 
taking had occurred. 
Sax had predicted that the "logically antecedent inquiry into the 
nature of the owner's estate" language would lead to results that the 
Lucas Court did not anticipate.374 
This characterization of property rights may very well lead in a 
direction the Lucas Court did not intend to go. Simply stated, the 
Lucas rule says that government's right to constrain the use of 
property without paying compensation is limited by what it with-
held from owners at the outset. Government cannot change the 
rules of the game after the game has started.375 
The extent to which the court in Kim went to lay the groundwork 
to pass muster under Lucas indicates the realistic possibility of the 
application of green wood through the mechanism of state property 
laws.376 Nevertheless, this case is subject to at least one interpretation 
that weakens its inherent limitations argument. If these inherent 
limitations are viewed as simply limited because of the pre-existing 
regulation,377 the effect may be the shift of the burden of the regula-
tion to the previous owner, who held title before the regulation was 
enacted. This might lower the purchase price, or prevent the sale 
entirely (which would distinguish it from the facts in Kim), enabling 
the aggrieved sellers to claim the taking. Any lowering of the market 
price, however, would not trigger compensation under the rule in 
Lucas. 
confusion in this respect stems from the Supreme Court's emphasis on the nuisance 
doctrine in Lucas to illustrate the type of background restriction of State law that 
would inhere in a property owner's title (see, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (property 
owner's title contains the restrictions on use that "could have been achieved in the 
courts ... under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its comple-
mentary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally"». However, we do 
not think that this aspect of the Lucas opinion should be read so narrowly. 
Id. at 315 (selective citations omitted). 
873 Id. at 319. 
374 See generally Sax, Property Rights, supra note 344. 
375Joseph L. Sax, Rights that "Inhere in the Title Itself': The Impact of the Lucas Case on 
Western Waterlaw, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 943, 944 (1993). 
376 See Kim, 681 N.E.2d at 314. 
877 For this interpretation, see Kass & McCarroll, supra note 273, at 3. 
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The second case decided by the Court of Appeals was Anello v. 
Zoning Board of Appeal, in which the court used the reasoning de-
veloped in Kim to hold that since "petitioner acquired her property 
after the enactment of the steep-slope ordinance, its enforcement does 
not deprive her of a property interest."378 
The third case, Gazza v. New York Department of Environmental 
Conservation,379 considers a state wetlands preservation program. 
The case involved property purchased by petitioner in a "residen-
tially-zoned district of which 65% had been inventoried as tidal wet-
lands."380 Petitioner applied for setback variances under the applicable 
state regulations381 to the New York State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation (DEC), but the application was denied after an 
administrative hearing, based upon the failure of the petitioner to 
show that the variance would have no adverse impact on the wet-
lands.382 Additionally, upon the adoption of the decision of the hearing 
officer, the DEC found that "the proposed construction of a sanitary 
system threatened both marine life and humans, that other contami-
nants threatened the area and that flooding problems would be in-
creased."383 The New York State Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, upheld the lower court's dismissal of petitioner's takings claim 
on the grounds that where "a landowner does not have a reasonable 
investment-backed expectation that he would be able to build a resi-
dence on his parcel, he cannot claim a regulatory taking when his 
application for a permit to allow the construction of a building is 
denied."384 
The Court of Appeals cites as justification for the decision in Gazza 
reasoning that is clearly based on the state legislature's findings of a 
stewardship toward its ecologically vital tidal wetlands.385 In affirming 
the decision of the Appellate Division, the court noted that: 
In 1973, the Legislature concluded that "tidal wetlands constitute 
one of the most vital and productive areas of our natural world, 
378 See Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal, 678 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1997) (citing Kim, 681 N.E.2d 
at 312). 
379 See Gazza v. New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1036 (N.Y. 1997). 
380 See id. 
381 N.Y. COMPo CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 661.6 (1995). 
382 See Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1036-37. 
383 See id. at 1037. 
384 See Gazza v. New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 634 N.Y.S.2d 740, 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1995). 
385 See Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1038. 
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and that their protection and preservation are essential." (L. 1973, 
c 790, § 1). The Legislature also noted its concern that much of 
the State's tidal wetlands had already been irreparably destroyed 
or despoiled and the remaining wetlands were in imminent danger 
of the same fate. (id.). Pursuant to these findings, the Legislature 
enacted the Tidal Wetlands Act and struck a balance between 
ecological and economic consideration by preserving and protect-
ing tidal wetlands while permitting reasonable economic use and 
development .... 
To implement this policy, the Legislature directed the Commis-
sioner of Environmental Conservation to inventory all tidal wet-
lands in the State of New York (ECL 25-0201). The Commissioner 
was also empowered to regulate the use of inventoried wetlands 
as well as the areas immediately adjacent thereto.386 
This reasoning clearly is supportive of the thesis herein, and repre-
sents the raison d'etre for green wood, which is the enforceability of 
legislative mandates to protect the environment. It also empowers 
states to act in their best interests and thereby is an immutable part 
of states' rights. 
In addressing the takings issue as addressed by Lucas, the court 
again referred to the "logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of 
the owner's estate."3B7 In this analysis the court ruled that "a promul-
gated regulation forms part of the title to property as a pre-existing 
rule of State law."388 The "petitioner's claim that the denial of his 
variance was a 'taking' must fail because he never owned an absolute 
right to build on his land without a variance."389 
The New York State Court of Appeals has taken up the Lucas 
Court's challenge and has fashioned a state property law that includes 
386 See id. 
337Id. 
Our courts have long recognized that a property interest must exist before it may be 
"taken." . .. Neither maya taking claim be based upon property rights that have 
already been taken away from a landowner in favor of the public. For example, 
government may "assert a permanent easement that was a pre-existing limitation upon 
the landowner's title" (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1028-29). 
Similarly, regulatory limitations that "inhere in the title itself' will bind a purchaser 
(Id. at 1029). To paraphrase the Supreme Court's ruling, the purchase of a "bundle of 
rights" necessarily includes the acquisition of a bundle of limitations. 
Id. at 1039 (selective citations omitted). 
333 See id. at 1039. 
389 Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1039. "Petitioner cannot base a taking claim upon an interest he never 
owned. The relevant property interests owned by the petitioner are defined by those state laws 
enacted and in effect at the time he took title and they are not dependent on the timing of state 
action pursuant to such law." Id. at 1040-41. 
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the state's environmental values,390 as evidenced by the body of its 
statutory and regulatory laws, into the bundle of rights. They have 
set the framework for the constitutionally permissible acceptance of 
green wood into the bundle of sticks. The use by New York of the 
body of its laws, its corpus juris as the basis for the Lucas-initiated 
"logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate," 
has a validity beyond the justifications given in Kim, and those spe-
cifically enumerated in Lucas for its justification. That basis is the 
historical evolution of property laws, which since Blackstone have 
been held to be subject to the laws of the land. 
The Court of Appeals decisions almost totally undermine the Lucas 
case (although within the very parameters which Justice Scalia's opin-
ion left unresolved). The Court of Appeals decision increases the 
scope of the police power to affect those property rights that were 
never part of the bundle of rights to begin with. While these decisions 
are not ecologically grounded, the recognition of environmental laws 
as the corpus juris of the state clears the way for the application of 
green wood. 
VII. THE UPSHOT OF GREEN Woon391 
Beyond the theoretical construct of a metaphor that applies the 
duties of ecological protection and environmental context to real prop-
erty law, the question of how these principles will affect the interplay 
between real property owners and the environment is a valid one. 
There is no intention that green wood will evolve to stifle develop-
ment. "The focus of environmental problems is not, as is sometimes 
suggested, the mere fact of change, which it is said environmental 
zealots cannot accommodate, but rather a rate of change so destabi-
lizing as to provoke crises .... "392 There is, however, a design to afford 
society and developers with the mechanisms with which to base sub-
stantive decisions on environmentally sound assessment. 
Politically, green wood is ironically the embodiment of both prop-
erty rights393 and states' rights. As a part of the real property law, it 
390 The court noted that the wetlands regulations in question (NYECL § 25--0102) were 
implemented "to balance ecological and economic considerations." Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1038. 
391 See LEOPOLD, supra note 32, at 235. The title of Leopold's group of essays-"The Land 
Ethic," "Wilderness," and "Conservation Esthetic"-is "The Upshot." 
392 Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 188 (1980). 
393 It is unfortunate that "property rights" have been raised to an ideology that is based on a 
misunderstanding of the bundle of sticks, and a general denial of the correlation of rights and 
duties. 
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enforces the rights of property owners who might be aggrieved by 
the inappropriate behavior of others, and recognizes that such behav-
ior even when otherwise lawful can amount to a violation of the 
property rights of others. This is very much a function of property 
rights, but it focuses those rights on those who are preserving the 
status quo rather than those who wish to change it by altering the 
environment. Even Locke states, "Man therefor in society having 
property, they have such right to the goods, which by law of the 
community are theirs, that nobody hath a right to take their sub-
stance of any part of it from them, without their own consent, without 
this they have no property at all."394 In a society there is a balance of 
property rights between owners of property; it is not merely a bal-
ance between property rights and regulation. 
With the understanding of the environment that ecology provides, 
we know that the private use of land by one landowner affects the 
private use of land by another. In the past these balances were made 
with reference to such things as economics or priority in time; green 
wood mandates that the balancing be made based on environmental 
ethics. It is simply a choice of whose property rights will be enforced, 
and the decision will no longer be based solely on the economic balance 
between the parties (which in the past was motivated by the need to 
foster economic development), but will be based on the important 
societal interest of preserving the environment. 
Green wood also transcends the bounds of nuisance law, which holds 
to its definition in prohibiting an invasion of another's interest that is 
unreasonable, in that it is dependent upon what is intolerable to 
society. Actions that were once tolerable, such as the filling of a 
wetland, are now deemed intolerable. This is manifested by legislation 
and regulation, for how else does society express its values? The 
green wood allows for the enforcement of these values, which are 
embodied in law. Much as the Gazza court justified its finding on the 
legislative intent to protect tidal wetlands, courts employing green 
wood will use the laws of the jurisdiction to evaluate the treatment 
given to a piece of real property. The law that must be upheld under 
green wood is primarily state and local laws, which reflect the public 
policy of the states and localities. This is an issue of states' rights. If 
New York declares through its legislature that preservation of tidal 
wetlands is a public policy priority of the state, then interference with 
394 5 LOCKE, WORKS, supra note 193, at 421. 
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that policy-questioning its police powers-is a direct affront to the 
federalist traditions. This is especially true when that state's highest 
court has declared the public policy of protecting tidal wetlands to be 
the common law of the state, and part of the title to property taken 
subsequent to the enactment thereof. 
This is the first step in the recognition of green wood as part of the 
property formula. That step has been taken in New York, through 
Judge Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick's bold and innovative opinion, but 
has not yet caught on elsewhere. These types of decisions that incul-
cate the environmental values that most states have already legis-
lated into the corpus juris of that state will precede the de facto 
recognition of green wood as a stick in the bundle of rights. This is 
necessary under the slow and deliberate evolutionary structure of the 
common law. The issue then is one of the necessity of green wood in 
light of both the acceptance of environmental values in the national 
corpus juris and the resultant avoidance of the takings doctrine. The 
need to infuse green wood into real property law is based on the 
fundamental importance of ecology and environmental ethics, which 
should not be abrogated by a legislative body. This presents an obvi-
ous dichotomy: on the one hand, it is noted that the infusion of these 
values is based upon the change in societal values which have 
prompted the environmental revolution; on the other hand, the case 
is being made for the continuation of these policies despite the possi-
ble movement from that policy in reaction to this infusion. How can 
these be reconciled? 
The answer to the question and the remedy for the Kim line of 
reasoning is the acceptance of the principles of ecology and environ-
mental ethics into common law. It is well recognized that profound 
changes in the law, such as that contemplated with green wood, are 
often slow in coming.395 For a change of this type to evolve, it is clear 
that it will have to work its way through the common law processes 
to gain acceptance. This will involve the presentation of evidence of 
the existence of a stick that gives a duty of environmental context, 
and the convincing of a court that the law allows for such a result. 
Perhaps this will be repeated in some, if not all, states before it 
achieves recognition on a national level. Legislative enactments to 
effect this change in real property law will be faced with scrutiny 
under the Lucas case, but it seems that if the enactments are based 
390 See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 149-51 (2nd ed. 
1981). 
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firmly on the green wood theory of real property, they will pass the 
Court's muster. 
The New York Court of Appeals has taken a giant step toward the 
adoption of green wood by its ruling in the Kim case, which holds that 
the law of property in New York includes the full body of New York 
law, inclusive of the state constitution, statutes, and common law. This 
is borne out by the conclusion in that case, but is more importantly 
bolstered by the fact that New York has adopted many environmen-
tally friendly laws over the course of the past thirty years, including 
wetlands protection and endangered species protection. If a real prop-
erty owner in New York is subject to the constraints that these laws 
have placed against the land, then green wood may be a reality in that 
state. Even if these constraints are limited as against the purchasers 
who took title with constructive knowledge of these restrictions, that 
would be a major change in property law. 
Several troubling issues remain with regard to the Kim decision. 
First is the issue of whether the rights of prior purchasers will be 
subject to a taking; such a problem could manifest itself by a challenge 
to the title given by the seller to the now restricted purchaser.396 This 
could result in claims against title companies who unwittingly insured 
titles despite the enactment of a statute. The unintended effect could 
be an upsurge in title litigation, which would ultimately result in an 
effect on subsequent transfers. The second problem might be a public 
backlash against this disquieting of title, which could induce a legis-
lative remedy to specifically remove the statutory enactments from 
consideration as property law. This might have the concomitant nega-
tive effect of cementing the bundle of sticks with a legislative enact-
ment directed at maintaining the status quo. However, there are 
examples of situations in which societal values have been placed above 
property rights. These include regulation of hazardous waste sites 
under CERCLA397 as well as such accepted notions as a warrant of 
habitability in a lease. 
Additionally, though certiorari has been denied in the Kim case, a 
future appeal of a similar issue to the United States Supreme Court 
might encounter a bench that supports the position staked by dissent-
ing New York State Court of Appeals Judge Smith. Judge Smith 
896 As the dissent notes: "There is no evidence that the purchase price paid by the plaintiffs 
was based upon an awareness of the obligations and rights announced by the majority. Indeed, 
plaintiffs sued the sellers for fraud because they allegedly were unaware of such duties." Kim 
v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 325 n.7 (N.Y. 1997) (dissenting opinion). 
397 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
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points to the Loretto case to bolster his position that the physical 
invasion in Kim constituted a taking.398 This physical invasion is a high 
hurdle based on the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area, in 
spite of the wide swath left by the Lucas Court regarding the "logi-
cally antecedent inquiry" into the owner's title. 
Despite these problems, the Kim case provides a vehicle for the 
incorporation of societal values into real property law, much as the 
green wood concept would.399 The substantive difference is that a 
court would rule that the common law of property demonstrated that 
the bundle of sticks included a duty of environmental context, rather 
than pointing to the corpus juris of the state as the Kim court did. 
While this distinction seems more semantic than substantive, it is the 
semantic precedence that the common law thrives on, and announces 
that we are only now recognizing what has unfolded in real property 
law through its natural evolution. It is also a semantic distinction that 
the Supreme Court in Lucas gives credence to.400 In this sense green 
wood is also calculated to avoid the issue of takings, especially 
prospectively, in the spirit of Kim, but without the added baggage of 
statutory environmental law that the Supreme Court holds to be 
suspect. 
It is fair to inquire at this point how green wood in the common law 
of real property will function. Will it cause a rash of judge-made 
environmental laws ,401 or will the legislation be imposed more strictly? 
What will the effect of this be? Answering these questions requires 
the construction of hypothetical scenarios that mimic possible situ-
ations where the green wood in common law property can be en-
forced. It is useful to think of the enforcement of green wood as 
the en-forcement of environmental context, and in this sense the ag-
grieved party whose property rights are threatened is not the party 
who seeks to change the status quo, but the party who seeks to 
maintain it. Another analogy is helpful. Think of a cause of action 
based on environmental context as an analog of nuisance; an addi-
tional injury to property added to the list of six compiled by Black-
stone.402 
398 See Kim, 681 N.E.2d at 316. 
399 See id. at 315. 
400 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1991). 
401 If anything, the thought of judicial legislation is comforting in the face of the "juror 
legislation" which was used to determine the validity of the land-use regulation in Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterey v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1426-80 (9th Cir. 1996). 
402 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, JONES BLACKSTONE 1736 (William Cary Jones ed., 1915). 
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At least two basic scenarios which focus issues of environmental 
context could exist. The first is a private action between landowners 
to prevent an action that one landowner claims violates the environ-
mental context of the land where the action is to take place. A factual 
situation that could spark this type of action could include proposals 
ranging from major changes, such as a change from residential to 
industrial use, to de minimis changes, such as the cutting (or even 
trimming) of a certain tree. Obviously, there have to be specific limi-
tations to this action so that its use does not become (1) used for de 
minimis changes; (2) used as a sword to impose the will of neighbors 
upon the other rights of the landowner; and (3) an endless abyss of 
litigation. 
These actions could be limited by the position that environmental 
context is a public rather than a wholly private value, and the use of 
environmental context as a private cause of action is limited as it must 
be shown to (1) be a public policy, i.e., the municipality has regulated 
the cutting of the trees in question; or (2) be a nuisance.403 The use of 
environmental context as a criterion could also add to basic nuisance 
4011 In many cases the rights of neighboring landowners could be protected adequately by 
resort to the law of nuisance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 
192 (Wis. 1982), deals with a landowner's right to sunlight for a solar home. See generally J. Otto 
Grunow, Wisconsin Recognizes the Power of the Sun: Prah v. Maretti, and the Solar Access Act, 
1983 WIS. L. REV. 1263, 1272-89 (noting that an owner of land does not have an absolute or 
unlimited right to use the land in a way which injures the rights of others; the uses by one 
landowner must not unreasonably impair the uses or enjoyment of the other neighboring 
landowners). In Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205, 219 (Cal. 1982), the California Supreme Court held 
that "a landowner must act as a reasonable person in maintaining his property in a reasonably 
safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others .... " 
(emphasis added). This remedy is available for those who need to enforce the prohibition against 
harmful use. Under proper circumstances, nuisance, both public and private, might also be used 
to enforce the duty of environmental context. 
However, the proper circumstances are often few and far between. There are severe limita-
tions to the use of nuisance as a remedy for environmental threats. In the case of Leatherbury 
v. Gaylord Fuel Corp., 347 A.2d 826, 832 (Md. App. 1975) (quoting Adams v. Commissioners of 
Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 170 (1954», the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that "[t]o constitute a 
nuisance per 8e, the activity sought to be enjoined must be a nuisance at all times and under 
any circumstances regardless of location or surroundings." This led the court to conclude that 
the possibility that the alleged nuisance (which was a stone quarry that had not yet begun 
operations) could be operated in a manner which would not constitute a nuisance, it could not 
be considered a nuisance per 8e. See id. "Thus, a court will not act, in anticipation of a threatened 
nuisance, to enjoin a legitimate activity unless the circumstances plainly show that the activity 
will be conducted as a nuisance." 1d. Interestingly, the plaintiffs claimed that the enactment of 
the Maryland Environmental Policy Act acted to broaden the Maryland law of nuisance for 
environmental protection. See id. at 833. The court noted, however, that "[n]othing in the Act 
supports [their] view that either new or enlarged rights were intended to be created in an action 
to enjoin a prospective nuisance by a neighboring landowner, nor does the Act purport to enact 
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law.404 The basic limitation, however, is that individuals do not deter-
mine what the environmental context is; that is a task for govern-
ment-one that is based squarely on ecology and environmental eth-
ics. The individual who would be aggrieved by the cutting down of a 
particular tree could apply to the municipality for an ordinance that 
makes the preservation of that tree a part of the environmental 
context of the municipality, but that would require proof of environ-
mental context. 
Private actions, because of the public policy aspects of green wood, 
must have this high threshold. Public actions, however, are the main 
area in which environmental context could be enforced. These public 
actions would be initiated by a permit request or by the legislative 
process. A permit to conduct an action which under an environmental 
impact assessment process indicated that the environmental context 
was to be changed would assess the change and mandate alternatives. 
In jurisdictions with assessment procedures in place this process 
would simply coincide with the current procedure. It would add the 
question of environmental context, but the answer to that question 
could be elicited by the date provided in most environmental impact 
statements. The second step, which is nothing more than a substan-
tive use of the environmental impact assessment, would be mandated 
by operation of law, in this case the real property law that requires 
the maintenance of the environmental context. 
new criteria for a trial court to use in determining whether a future activity will constitute a 
nuisance." [d. at 834. 
404 Although the effect of green wood and environmental context on nuisance law is somewhat 
beyond the scope of this Article, it is well noted that this type of proposal, which euphemistically 
would put an attorney general in every backyard, would promote litigation and prompt the 
proliferation of "not in my backyard" suits. As such, strict limitation must accompany the right 
to sue, including the elimination of certain categories of damages that might promote unneces-
sary litigation. 
The NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) phenomenon refers to instances oflocal, grassroots 
opposition to the construction of various unwanted facilities, such as prisons, mega-
malls and garbage dumps. Many commentators have labeled NIMBY movements as 
narrow, self-interested and shortsighted. Others have praised them as providing "an 
energetic check against the kinds of projects that many people now regard as absurd 
maldevelopment." Whether you love or despise these sorts of movements, it cannot be 
denied that they represent civic participation in its most dynamic form. Though focused 
in scope and temporary in duration, such NIMBY activity is exactly what Tocqueville 
had in mind when he stated over a century and a half ago that Americans had "carried 
to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the object of their common 
desires." 
Pettinico, supra note 270, at 27 (footnote omitted). 
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An example of a likely candidate for enforcement of environmental 
context is a plan by the Du Pont Company to mine titanium immedi-
ately adjacent to the Okefenokee National Wildlife Refuge in Georgia. 
This operation, which is proposed for privately held and leased land, 
is arguably a violation of the environmental context of the site.406 
Under the current state of the law, the company would apply for a 
permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, for the dredging 
and filling of wetlands.406 "The company would have to get permits 
from the Army Corps of Engineers before dredging and filling the 
wetlands, and the Environmental Protection Agency can veto deci-
sions by the Army Corps, although this power is rarely used."407 
Environmental context could protect this area and prevent the min-
ing operation, which "John Kasbohm, an ecologist at the refuge, said 
'threatens the very character of the swamp."'408 An environmental 
impact assessment under NEPA would also probably be triggered, 
but that would not mandate substantive action. As the Supreme 
Court wrote in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,409 
"Other statutes may impose substantive environmental obligations on 
federal agencies, but NEPA merely prohibits uninformed-rather 
than unwise-agency action."41o The element of environmental con-
text violation disclosed by the environmental impact assessment, 
much like a violation of the Endangered Species Act411 revealed by an 
environmental impact assessment, would trigger substantive issues 
requiring mitigation, despite the character of the NEPA inquiry re-
maining procedural. Thus, no change is required within NEPA, and 
the environmental context is enforceable to the extent allowed by 
local adherence to the real property law that engenders it. 
The assessment therefore triggers inquiry into whether the pro-
posed action fits the environmental context of the site, which becomes 
a question of fact, and results in substantive effects. Several possibili-
ties could result: (1) the action could be found to be within the envi-
406 See John H. Cushman, Jr., Official Attacks Plan/or Mining Project, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 
1997, at A14. 
406 33 U.S.C.A § 1314 (1987). 
407 Cushman, supra note 405, at A14. 
408ld. 
409 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989). 
410 ld. (footnote omitted). 
411 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). "Each Federal Agency shall, in consultation with and with 
the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such 
agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as an 'agency action') is not likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of any endangered species .... " ld. 
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ronmental context-the action may proceed; or (2) the action is not 
within the environmental context-the action may not proceed, or 
must comply with changes that fit it within the environmental con-
text. 
A similar situation exists near the new Joshua Tree National Park 
in California's Mojave Desert. The Chuckwalla Valley is a peninsula 
of unprotected land surrounded on three sides by the Park. This 
valley is the proposed site for a landfill that would receive as much as 
20,000 tons of Southern California's trash daily.412 The Park has no 
jurisdiction outside its boundaries, and the use of this site violates 
nothing but the environmental context of the site. 
The procedural change that could protect this site's environmental 
context is quite simple. Annexed to the environmental impact state-
ment, and based on the real property law requirement of environ-
mental context, is a single question: does this proposed action change 
the environmental context of the ecosystem? If so, no permit is issued, 
and the applicant can modify or drop its plans. Despite the significant 
consequences of such an action, the significance of mining around the 
boundaries of the Great Okefenokee Swamp, Joshua Tree National 
Park, or Yellowstone National Park, have arguably more significant 
consequences. 
Environmental impact assessment statutes afford the opportunity 
to infuse both environmental ethics and ecological concerns into the 
planning and decisionmaking processes. They fall short of that goal 
because most are generally only procedural in nature, and carry little 
substantive imprimatur with which to actuate their stated goals.413 In 
the case of Matter of King v. Saratoga City Board of Supervisors,414 
the New York Court of Appeals noted that in: 
E.F.S. Ventures v. Foster (71 N.Y.2d 359, 364-75), involving con-
struction of an oceanside resort without benefit of comprehensive 
environmental review, we observed that the State had made pro-
tection of the environment one of its foremost policy concerns, and 
thus "our statute, unlike many others, imposes substantive duties 
412 See Verne G. Kopytoff, Mojave Park Supporters Fight Plans for Dump, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
6, 1997, at A33. 
413 "The purpose of an environmental impact statement is to provide detailed information 
about the effect which a proposed action is likely to have on the environment, to list ways in 
which any adverse effects of the action might be minimized, and to suggest alternatives to the 
action." In the Matter of SDDS, Inc.,472 N.W.2d 502, 508 (S.D. 1991). 
414 Matter of King v. Saratoga City Bd. of Supervisors, 675 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (N.Y. 1996). 
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on the agencies of government to protect the quality of the envi-
ronment for the benefit of all the People of the State."415 
These statutes, therefore, might provide one procedural vehicle for 
the implementation of the green wood stick principle.416 It is well 
noted that green wood bends, rather than breaks, and is a metaphor 
for the flexibility of a substantive environmental assessment proce-
dure based on environmental context. This would not require that a 
substantive element be injected into these statutes. The effect of 
green wood on NEPA and similar state impact assessment provision 
would be similar to the effect of a local law, which would be recognized 
during the assessment process, and which could be enforced by the 
courts even where the assessment was only procedural in nature. 
Green wood will not inject the substantive element into environ-
mental assessment; it does, however, provide a more objective focus 
for an assessment, and could use the assessment process for its future 
implementation. This fundamental change requires the understanding 
that the issue is between competing property rights, not between 
regulation and property rights. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Describing any perceived change in the very essence of real prop-
erty laws leads us to the philosophical principles on which our system 
of laws and our political being is grounded. When formulating a posi-
tion, it would be wise to rethink the use of philosophies that were 
derived at a time and under such circumstances that necessarily 
excluded ideas that only today have come to light. Indeed, how would 
Locke have been affected by sharing the earth with five billion people, 
or the knowledge that the incessant burning of fossil fuel could affect 
the planet's climate? 
The reality of the issues that confront us today must be considered 
in the body of property law, which has appropriately evolved in the 
past to face social issues through the vehicle of the common law. 
Current conditions warrant the acceptance of a definition of real 
property that takes the environment into full account. To paraphrase 
Aldo Leopold: To do otherwise would be both unethical and contrary 
to scientific fact. Green wood recognizes both modern scientific reali-
ties and societal decisions that have already been made. It ties these 
to the most basic concept of law-the idea of property. 
416Id. (citations omitted). 
416 See Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, The EIS at fJ5, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 1994, at 3. 
